Rhetoric and Reality: US-Africa Relations since 9/11

-“Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers.  Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders” – U.S. National Security Strategy, September 2002  

-“There is a dividing line in our world…separating two visions of justice and the value of life…We believe in the values that uphold the dignity of life, tolerance, and freedom, and the right of conscience.  And we know that this way of life is worth defending.  There is no neutral ground…in the fight between civilization and terror, because there is no neutral ground between good and evil, freedom and slavery, and life and death.”
 – President Bush, March 19, 2004 

Introduction

Although three years have passed since the 9/11 attacks, the impact of this event on the American government’s relationship with countries in Africa, is not yet clear.  There is no question, however, that the Bush administration believes that particular regions of Africa are central to the war on terrorism.  With this in mind, the Bush administration has adopted numerous policies that are meant to help African governments fight terrorism.  These policies are the product of both old and new concerns and are meant to help Africans develop stronger democracies, more stable state institutions, and greater economic growth.   

To understand and assess these policies, this essay examines the Bush administration’s policies with respect to three specific issues: 1) foreign aid allocations for development and military assistance;2 2) the protection and assistance to African refugees; and 3) the extent to which African countries have implemented domestic anti- terror legislation in response to the new international focus on terrorism.  These specific issues were chosen in order to measure the Bush administration’s actual commitment to Africa and to measure Africa’s actual commitment to the war on terror.  While examining foreign aid distributions, African refugees, and African domestic legislation are certainly not the only important variables, they do offer a unique perspective on US-Africa relations since 9/11.

Despite the difficulties that such an assessment poses, it is clearly important to look closely at how 9/11 has affected U.S.-Africa relations.  First of all, as a region, sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest in the world and where we find the most failed and weak states.  From the point of view of many governments in Africa, the attitudes and policies the US government adopts are incredibly important.  As the lone superpower since the early 1990s, the United States has the ability to persuade and manipulate institutions such as the United Nations, the WTO, and the World Bank and IMF, in which African governments are in close contact.  From the point of view of the US government, the supply of natural resources and its proximity to the Middle East and North Africa, not to mention the porous borders, the endemic poverty, the weak state institutions, and the social diversity (religious, ethnic and linguistic) would seem to make this region important in the war on terrorism.  Indeed, as the quote above suggests, government officials have pointed to the ways in which poverty and weak states facilitate terror networks and to the fact that these issues must be addressed, especially in Africa.  Thus, both the US government and the African governments have something to gain from mutually beneficial relationships: African governments seek economic development and foreign aid, and as the US government seeks natural resources and regional security.

The crux of the argument is that since 9/11 U.S. foreign policy has focused on helping African countries improve their military and law and order capabilities but has not addressed those issues that most Africans believe are most important: economic development, the delivery of basic services, and further democratization.  The results of this new emphasis since 9/11 is that the United States has increased its military aid more dramatically than development aid, has encouraged African countries to adopt more draconian anti-terrorism laws, and has failed to commit resources to the ongoing humanitarian crises on the continent. Such a focus on security, in countries that have experienced years of authoritarian rule, may not bode well for the process of democratization that is still in its beginning stages.  Further, it is doubtful that the battle for the hearts and minds of Africans can be won simply with more military aid and tougher anti-terrorism laws.  There is an important link between poverty, weak states, and terrorism, but unfortunately, the government’s policies on these linkages do not match its rhetoric.  And finally, despite the increases in development and military funding after 9/11, these resources have declined over the last year as the war against Iraq continues.

Hope and Despair: The Dynamics of Political Change in the 1990s

The 1990s in sub-Saharan Africa were extraordinary.  After decades of authoritarian and military rule, a vast majority of these regimes were replaced with democratically elected leaders.  The changes that swept through Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s affected African politics in dramatic ways.  Regimes that existed through the support of the Soviet Union were now forced to fend for themselves.  Leaders who based their legitimacy on the promise that less democracy would bring more economic development were forced to account for decades
 2
of negative growth.  And governments that told their populations that they were not ready for democracy were confronted with the images and voices of those in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union literally tearing down the state’s authority and demanding more participation and accountability. 

Perhaps the most vivid example of the changes that occurred throughout the continent was the release of Nelson Mandela from prison on February 2, 1990.  After spending 27 years as a political prisoner, Mandela helped to orchestrate the peaceful end to apartheid rule, culminating in the elections of 1994 when he was elected President.  This case, while perhaps the most well known, was one of many successful transitions from authoritarian rule in sub-Sub Saharan Africa.  In the final analysis, the 1990s represented a titanic shift in the region away from authoritarian regimes and toward more democratic practices.  For example, from 1990-1995, the number of African countries holding competitive legislative elections quadrupled to 38 out of 47 countries in the sub- Saharan region.  Equally impressive, opposition parties won more seats during this period and there was much more leadership turnover.  And finally, while before 1990, there was only one sitting chief executive officer was removed via elections, between 1990-95, incumbent chief executives lost power in ten countries.  

At the same time, if the 1990s will be remembered for the move away from authoritarian regimes, and the demand of African societies for more participation and accountability, it will also be remembered as offering the world its first up-close encounter with what we now refer to as failed states and for reintroducing the concept of genocide.  In many African countries, the pace and extent of the political change resulted in three possible outcomes: successful transition of power, the inability of governments to effectively provide social control once authoritarian regimes were abolished, and the increase in civil violence as political contenders utilized force, fear, and coercion to gain control of the government.  

While the successes were impressive, the failures were catastrophic.  If South Africa is the “success” example, then the various conflicts and instability in Somalia, Rwanda, eastern Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Sierra Leone, and the Sudan represent the failures.  In each case, the consequences of conflict and disorder were violence, civilian deaths, the spread of disease, the exploitation of natural resources, and the displacement of millions of people – largely women and children.  Because of the weakness of their home governments, many people depended upon support from the international community and many sought asylum in the United States.  In fact, San Diego represents one of the areas where many Sudanese refugees were sent in the late 1990s.

Throughout each of these crisis areas the international community discovered something that had largely gone unnoticed in academic and policymaking circles: the existence of failed states.  While this phenomenon has received much more attention since the attacks of September 11, it was, unfortunately, a central feature of the African political landscape in the 1990s.  Failed states, which are states that are unable to secure its borders, provide security, and regulate economic markets, produce an environment that is prone to warlordism, increased terrorist activity, the exploitation of natural resources (such as diamonds), and the movement of large numbers of people away from their homes who must depend upon alternative authority structures to protect them.  While the Bush administration, and many NGOS, currently stresses the fact that failed states are threats to U.S. national security, it is important to realize that this reality is not new to many Africans.

U.S. Response to Political Change

Not surprisingly, the United States was supportive of the new democratic governments in Africa and celebrated the so-called “end of history.”3  While such rhetoric was common in diplomatic circles, many of the states that received substantial financial support during the Cold War were ignored once the Soviet Union collapsed and newly democratic states failed to see large increased in foreign aid.

Since the end of World War II, foreign aid has been used as a tool of foreign policy, from the Marshall Plan to America’s support of non-communist, authoritarian regimes throughout Africa.  This was especially the case during the Cold War as the United States provided support to regimes in Zaire, Somalia, Angola, and the Sudan.  With the end of the Cold War, however, foreign aid to Africa declined.  For example, from 1992-2000, the amount of aid dropped approximately 52% from 1992 to 2000 (from 1.93 billion to 933 million).  

Compared to other industrialized countries, however, America has never allocated as many resources to foreign aid.  For example, as a percentage of its GNP, America’s foreign aid distribution ranks last among the 22 members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with only 0.14% (or about $15 billion) going to foreign aid worldwide (2003 numbers).  Of this, only 1/100th of 1% of the US budget ($1 billion) is spent on aid to sub-Saharan Africa.  Between fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2004, US foreign aid has increased from 0.11% of GNP to 0.14% (an increase from approximately $10.8 billion to $15.7 billion).  

While the United Nations has suggested that members of the OECD allocate 0.7% of GNP to development assistance, only five of the 22 countries met this goal in 2003.4  It is estimated that if all the countries in the OECD met the 0.7% target, there would be an additional $114 billion available for foreign aid.  One further comparison puts these numbers in greater perspective: the total foreign aid budget proposed for 2005 amounts to a mere five percent of what the White House is requesting for the Department of Defense.  

Similarly, as more African states experienced conflict in the 1990s, the United States was largely absent in terms of providing military support to ensure security.  If there was a growing willingness of the US government to engage Africa militarily after the end of the Cold War, this all but disappeared after the Somalia debacle.  In this conflict, the United States took the lead in providing support for humanitarian aid and seeking to capture the warlords who were continuing to promote insecurity in the country.  The deaths of 18 soldiers in Somalia resulted in the United States leaving Somalia very soon thereafter. 

Indeed, the so-called “Somalia-effect” was crucial for President Clinton to adopt presidential decision directive 25, which listed 16 factors that much be considered before the US government would support peacekeeping activities.  With these added restrictions, intervention in the Rwanda genocide and the numerous civil wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, were seriously curtailed.  These conflicts put added strain on weak states and threatened the movement to democracy across the continent.  Not only did millions of Africans die in these conflicts, but they also produced millions of refugees, thereby putting even more pressure on African governments.    

For the most part, the United States failed to utilize its military or diplomatic strength to address many of these conflicts.  When two U.S. embassies were attacked in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, this general disorder directly affected the United States.  In many ways, these terrorist bombings demonstrated the extent to which Africa’s security dilemma might affect U.S. security interests.   
 
Thus, on September 10, 2001, sub-Saharan Africa represented the best and the worst of the post-Cold War era: elected governments replaced authoritarian regimes but weak and failed states proved incapable of governing those within its boundaries; free market principles, including lower tariffs and privatization replaced state-controlled economies but poverty, unemployment and dependence on the West increased; more stable governments meant that better data could be gathered on the quality of healthcare, education, and basic services but these data showed an HIV/AIDS pandemic that most African countries were ill-equipped to address.  

US-Africa Relations after 9/11: The Politics of Mixed Messages

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, government officials made numerous statements, and enacted various policies, that changed US foreign policy.  Given the conditions discussed above – the emergence of fragile democracies, the existence of weak or failed states, the various civil wars, and the constant pressure of refugees – would the US respond differently to the challenges that face the continent?  In short, how has the “war on terror” affected US foreign policy towards Africa?  This question will be explored by focusing on development aid, military aid, assistance to refugees, and the passage of anti-terrorism legislation in African countries.

Africa reacts to 9/11

As with the vast majority of the world’s countries, each and every African state condemned the September 11 attacks and publicly endorsed America’s “war on terrorism.”  African countries were fully in support of the attacks against Afghanistan in October 2001 and welcomed America’s commitment to seeking out those persons and groups who terrorized civilians and challenged legitimate state authority with violence.  As America’s priorities focused on the war on terror, however, many of the issues that African leaders hoped would dominate the 21st century were overshadowed.  All available diplomatic and financial resources quickly turned to Central Asia and the Middle East where American decision makers had decided to focus their efforts.  Resources that might have been utilized for foreign aid, debt relief, HIV-AIDS, or institution building in Africa, were focused elsewhere.  As early as a few months after the attacks, African leaders expressed concerns that the United States’ interest with Central Asia, and increasingly with Iraq, meant that less political and economic resources were left for the many issues facing Africa.

By the time the world was debating how to handle the situation in Iraq, most African countries were decidedly in the anti-war camp.  The African members on the United Nations Security Council, Angola, Guinea, and Cameroon, all favored more inspections rather than war.5  In addition, of the 44 countries that agreed to become allies in the “coalition of the willing,” only four were from Africa: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda.6  Not surprisingly, these countries have supplied very little in terms of military or economic assistance for the war in Iraq.  Yet, as will be discussed below, there are importance incentives to joining America’s war on terror, even if this support is less visible.

In addition to these four countries, there are a number of other African states that continue to be mentioned by the Bush administration as leaders of the war on terrorism.  For example, in the Department of State’s annual “Patterns of Global Terrorism” reports from 2002 to 2004, Angola, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda were mentioned in each and Mali was mentioned in two of the reports.  Similarly, each of the reports highlighted the fact that Sudan was still one of the seven countries in the world recognized as a state sponsor of terrorism and that Somalia was still a likely place for terrorists to organize.  Finally, in his only visit to Africa in July 2003, President Bush focused on the war on terrorism and Africa’s role in this war.  

Development Assistance since 9/11

As stated above, development assistance to Africa declined during the 1990s.  While it increased slightly during the end of President Clinton’s second term, this assistance was still very small in terms of the total percentage spent on development assistance worldwide.  Since the September 11 attacks, development assistance to Africa has increased slightly.  Table 1 shows the development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa as well as the total development assistance allocated since 1999.

Table 1: Development Assistance to Africa and Total Development Assistance, 1999-
2005 ($ in thousands)

Fiscal year 2002 marks the first Bush Administration budget.  The executive branch submitted its budget requests to Congress in February 2001 but the final Senate and House Conference Reports were not voted on until December 2001, after the September 11th attacks.  Thus, this budget, at least marginally, reflects the changing priorities of the post-9/11 world.  Similarly, the fiscal year 2003 budget takes into account the war with Afghanistan and the fiscal year 2004 budget was passed in the midst of the invasion of Iraq. 
  
Such political realities help to explain the overall trends in development assistance to Africa and as a whole.  While there was a significant increase in development assistance to Africa since 2001 (approximately 10.3%), these allocations have decreased since.  Similarly, overall development assistance has increased approximately 3.7% from 2001 but it has declined the last two years. 

 These numbers tell part of the story.  It seems that while the Bush administration initially sensed that the war on terror was linked to developmental issues, as well as military ones, the financial realities of the war with Iraq has meant that there is much less money to spend on other parts of the world.  For example, in 2003, there were two supplemental appropriations to finance the war in Iraq that no doubt put pressure on other programs: one in April 2003 ($79 billion) and one in November 2003 ($87 billion).

It goes without saying that these allocations dwarf the amounts spent on overall development assistance and development assistance for Africa.  In fact, since World War II, the United States as allocated approximately 22 billion in development assistance to the entire sub-Saharan African region.  Similarly, during the 2004 fiscal year, four countries were given approximately five times the amount of aid than the entire sub-Saharan region received during the same year: Afghanistan (657 million); Jordan (460 million); Pakistan (395 million); and Turkey (255 million) (4.7 billion in total aid).

Of equal interest, however, is to identify the countries in Africa that have benefited the most, in terms of development assistance, under the Bush administration.  It is important to keep in mind that from 1945 to 1990, approximately $5 billion was sent to four countries: Somalia, Liberia, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), and the Sudan.  Each of these countries were central to America’s Cold War strategic interests and it is not surprising to find that approximately one-fourth of all development assistance from 1945-1990 went to these four countries.

In the 1990s, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) focused on countries that were committed to political and economic reform.7  Given these priorities, South Africa usually received the bulk of the development assistance from the mid-1990s, with Uganda, Mozambique, Ghana, and Ethiopia receiving large amounts as well.  Since 2001, however, there have been some important changes (see Table 2).  

Table 2: Development Assistance to Selected African Countries, 1998-2005 ($ in thousands)

Of the countries that were part of the coalition of the willing, or that were mentioned in State Department reports as important allies in the war on terror, only one has seen funding decrease (Eritrea).  In fact, the largest recipient of US development assistance is now Sudan – whose funding has increased 94.4% since 2001.  This is a country that in three consecutive State Department Global Terrorism reports has been identified as one of the seven state sponsors of terrorism.  There is no question that this increased funding reflects both security concerns as well as Khartoum’s recent efforts to end its decades-long civil war with rebels in the southern portion of the country.  At the same time, such commitments might send the wrong message with respect to the current violence in the Darfur region (a conflict that the Bush administration, and the world, has known about since April 2003).

Other countries that have benefited during the Bush administration include Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Angola.  Uganda, Nigeria and South Africa have all seen foreign aid increase but not at the same level as others.8  These allocations highlight what has been obvious to most observers since 9/11 – a new set of countries might receive disproportionate amounts of foreign aid based on the new strategic concerns, rather than based on need or support for democracy.  This seems to be the case especially with Sudan, Rwanda, and Angola, which the Freedom House rates as “not free.”  

Military Assistance since 9/11

While development assistance to the region has increased approximately 10% since 2001, spending on military preparedness has increased over 20% and spending to assist African governments to purchase weapons has increased 17%.  More generally, since 2001, funding for IMET and FMF has increased a total of 35.6% and 27.8%, respectively (see Table 3).  

This marks a dramatic shift in U.S. interests away from issues of peacekeeping,9 humanitarian aid, and democratization to those of security and law and order issues.  Even though failed states, and the related issues of refugees and the HIV-AIDS pandemic, were part of the African landscape before 9/11, it was only in response to these attacks that the US has devoted financial resources to help improve security.  Indeed, the National Security Strategy of 2002 recognized the need to deal with failed states, many of which are in Africa.  It is also interesting to note that funding for peacekeeping operations has decreased substantially since 2001 and Africa has seen its share of this funding reduced in half over the last few years.  

Table 3: Military Spending for sub-Saharan Africa and Total Military Spending since 1998 ($ in thousands)

In terms of IMET funding for specific African countries, those African countries that have been touted as central to the war on terror have received the bulk of the assistance (see Table 4).  The biggest winners are Angola, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, which did not receive any IMET funding in 2001.  Eritrea, Djibouti and Kenya have seen large increases as well.  The biggest loser since 2001 seems to be South Africa, which has seen its assistance decrease 95%.  Similarly, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya have seen FMF allocations increase dramatically since 2001.  Nigeria and South Africa have had their funding decreased (see Table 5).

Table 4: IMET funding for selected African countries, 1999-2005 ($ in thousands)

Table 5: FMF for selected African countries, 2000-2005 ($ in thousands)

Consistent with this emphasis on military spending for Africa, we also see more joint programs between the United States and selected African countries.  For example, the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) is a joint Department of State and Department of Defense program that provides training and equipment for the security forces of Mauritania, Chad, Niger and Mali.  Troops from these countries have been involved in the anti-terrorism campaign, fighting numerous terrorist organizations in the region.  In addition, the US recently established its first base on the African continent in Djibouti.  Camp Lemonier is the home to 1800 U.S. troops.  Under the auspices of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF), there is now a permanent US military presence in the region. In West Africa, the small island nation of Sao Tome has offered to provide another naval base and the US is considering this.  

The United States has also distributed funding to African governments through the Department of State’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program that was established in 1983.10  For example, in March 2002, in response to the terrorist attacks, President Bush submitted an emergency supplemental request for an additional $10 million for the ATA budget to be given to 19 countries, including Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia.  Similarly, in June 2003, the United States established the East Africa Counter-terrorism Initiative (EACTI) that distributed approximately $100 million to Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.  Through this initiative the United States has provided training on issues of counterterrorism, border control, law enforcement, criminal investigations, and airport security.  

Yet despite these programs, Africa’s share of the ATA budget has actually decreased since 2001.  For the 2001 fiscal year, only 4.2 million was requested for the entire sub-Saharan Africa region.  In 2002, only 1.3 million was requested.  In 2001, the assistance to Africa accounted for only 11% of the 38 million allocated to countries around the world.

Taken as a whole, it is clear that the Bush administration has sought to provide
funding to those countries that appear to be central to the war on terror.  Both development and military assistance have increased since 2001, but military assistance has grown at a faster rate.  It is also clear that while there is considerable rhetoric concerning the importance of human rights and democracy, this rhetoric is not consistent with policy.  There is no clear correlation between countries receiving foreign aid assistance and their commitment to either human rights or democracy.  In fact, countries like Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Angola and Djibouti, whose commitment to democratization is ambiguous at best, have received a bulk of the development and military assistance.  In a war that is defined as one pitting good versus evil, the message to Africa from the Bush Administration seems more nuanced.   

Assistance to Refugees since 9/11

One area of funding that has decreased since 9/11 is the assistance provided to refugees.  The Bush administration has proposed to cut U.S. humanitarian aid for refugees worldwide at a time when refugee populations have risen dramatically.  For example, the administration’s budget for fiscal year 2002 cut U.S. support for overseas refugee assistance by $5 million.  Over the last five years, funding for refugee relief has decreased approximately $57 million.  These cuts are harsh and are out of touch with the dire needs of the world’s refugees.  U.S. assistance should be directed towards those issues that are central to the African refugees themselves - poverty, health and safety.  Military funding to African regimes without providing more basic assistance for refugees is not the best policy to secure the region against terrorism.   

Currently, there are approximately 14 million people worldwide that are refugees.  At the end of 2001, Asia hosted the largest refugee population (48.3%), followed by Africa (27.5%).  By January 2002, Africa was reported to have approximately 3,305,100 refugees and 107,200 asylum seekers.  Refugees are driven from their homes by violence and may spend years in exile in refugee camps.  They are victims of war, civil strife, ethnic conflict, and political persecution who are seeking to live in freedom.  In contrast, asylum seekers flee their own country and seek sanctuary in a second state; applying for the right to be recognized as a refugee and receive the legal protection and assistance that status implies.   

Over the years, many refugees have come to the United States from various war stricken countries.  Many high priority cases that are of special interest to the United States are processed through the (UNHCR).  Before 9/11, the United States admitted approximately 80,000 refugees a year.  This figure represents one-half of one percent of refugees worldwide.  However, since 9/11, this number has decreased significantly. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) has noted that in 2002 the number of refugees dropped to 20,000. The IRC in San Diego and other international organizations throughout the country have urged the government to adopt a more aggressive policy with respect to refugees. Given the 14 million refugees worldwide, most of whom will never be able to return to their homelands, there has been an urgent need to increase resettlement efforts to previous levels. 

Although many nations have agreed to accept refugees on a temporary basis, only 17 countries worldwide participate in official resettlement programs for refugees, the United States being the main country of resettlement.  Refugees legally enter the United States after going through an extensive review process overseas, coordinated by the United States Department of State.  However, following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the U.S. government halted the refugee resettlement program and instituted a security review that established new screening procedures for incoming refugees, making it very difficult and time consuming for refugees to go through.  As a result, thousands of refugees languish in camps where they face hunger, disease, rape, or forcible return to the countries they fled.  

Since the 9/11 attacks, events in Iraq have dominated the headlines.  One of the consequences has been the limited response to the ongoing civil war in Sudan that has put thousands of people in desperate need of aid.  More than four million southern Sudanese have been forced to flee their homes and have become “internally displaced.”   Nearly one million southern Sudanese have fled Sudan and are now refugees in other countries. Thousands of children have been forced out of their homes due to civil unrest. Within this huge group of people, the majority of them are young boys who have seen their entire families killed – this group is now known as the “Lost Boys” of Sudan. Most of the boys have been in traumatic situations, such as running from attacks, witnessed shootings, starvation or death.  These boys are given a chance by the UNHCR, the IRC and other various international aid organizations, to travel to America and start a new life, leaving their traumatic experiences behind. 

Many Sudanese refugees have been sent to San Diego each year.  Nearly 25% of San Diego’s population is foreign-born; of which significant portion is refugee.  There is an estimated 800 Sudanese refugees living in San Diego today, mostly children and women.  Assistance to these African refugees is an important part of developing and strengthening U.S.-Africa relations.  Educating and assisting African refugees in the United States is a perfect opportunity for them to live and learn the great possibilities of a better life.  African refugees realize that the world is not just war and violence, but can be something much greater.  Living in the United States gives them the chance to start a safer and more peaceful life.  With the adequate resources and the right education, refugees can go back to Africa with a better understanding of democracy, tolerance, and conflict resolution.  In many ways, groups like the “Lost Boys” might be one of the keys to fighting and winning the war against terrorism.  Once they have understood a democracy and seen the great benefits, African refugees can go back home and practice what they have learned.  It is a small step that might lead to a great change in Africa.  With the help of international organizations, NGOs and small after school programs, like the Sudanese English Project in San Diego, Africans are able to take these steps.  In the end, African refugees begin to understand they deserve a life of education, health and safety, no matter what type of government or religion is in place. 

Anti-Terrorism Legislation in Africa since 9/11

 In light of the development assistance and military assistance that is linked to fighting the war on terror, it is not surprising to find an increasing number of African countries who have passed their own domestic anti-terror legislation.  For many of these countries, this is a disturbing sign, as finding the proper balance between security and liberty is difficult in the most advanced democracies, not to mention those that have been established in the last ten to twelve years.

As with any “anti-terrorism” legislation, the most important, and difficult, part of the lawmaking is defining who the terrorists are.11  Given the authoritarian pasts of many of the regimes in Africa, where the criminalization of political speech and association were justified as a means to “protect the state” from “enemies” and “subversive” activity, it is important that newly democratized countries resist the temptation to use the post-9/11 period to settle political scores with rivals.  

One country that has passed such legislation is South Africa.  Although government officials had been working on it since October 1998 to respond to gang violence in Cape Town during the 1990s, the pressure to pass this legislation did increase after 9/11.  As the spokesman for the Ministry of Safety and Security stated in November 2001 (before the legislation had been passed), “We have offered our support to the Americans in the global fight against terrorism and the fact that we do not yet have an anti-terrorism law has put us under pressure.”

The South African legislation defines a “terrorist act” as one that may “cause damage to property…or disrupt any public service [or] the delivery of any essential service to the public [or] create unrest.”  This is extremely broad language that might include political dissent, if it “creates unrest” or a labor strike that “disrupts any public service.”  The legislation also gives the police new powers to stop and search vehicles and people for “any article that could be used in connection with terrorist activity.”  Finally, the legislation also allows the government to detain an individual for up to 14 days without charging them with a crime if that person might hold information related to terrorism.  Given South Africa’s apartheid past, which included draconian detention laws, human rights organizations have argued that the country is taking a step backwards.

In addition to South Africa, Kenya, Tunisia, and Morocco have all passed new anti-terrorism legislation since 2001.  The United States have praised these actions and have encouraged other countries to do the same.  In the case of Kenya, the legislation established an Anti-Terrorism Police Unit as well as a National Counter-Terrorism
Center.  This law also allows the detention of suspected terrorists for 36 hours incommunicado.  There is a fear that the Kenyan government will use these new legal tools to not only combat international terrorist cells, such as al-Queda, but to silence legitimate political opposition as well.  The issue here is not that African governments should not take measures against terrorism.  Rather, the danger, especially in new democracies, is that those who represent political opposition might be targeted in addition to, or instead of, genuine terrorist groups.

Indeed, there is some evidence that this is already happening as we find many more African leaders have utilized the fear of terrorism to pursue ulterior political motives; many that threaten the rule of law and democratic rule.  For example, in comments to a Washington Post columnist in November 2002, Eritrea's Ambassador to the United States justified his government's arrest of journalists by claiming that detention without charge was consistent with the practices of democratic countries. He cited the roundup of material witnesses and aliens suspected of terrorist activities in the United States as proof.  Similarly, after the 9/11 attacks, representatives of the Nigerian Police stated there was a need to revive the Anti-Terrorist Squad set up by General Sanni Abacha (the former dictator).  Under Abacha, this law was used to intimidate and harass the media, the human rights community, and pro-democracy movements. 

Even a leader like President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe has not been afraid to invoke the war on terror to justify his actions.  In many cases, those accused of being “agents of terrorism” have been journalists.  In 2002, Zimbabwe passed the Public Order and Security Act and it has been on numerous occasions to detain journalists who criticize the government.  Those who commit such acts have been labeled “terrorists” and have been detained without any formal charges brought against them.  In November 2001, in response to the arrest of six journalists, a spokesman for President Mugabe stated, "as for the correspondents, we would like them to know that we agree with U.S. President Bush that anyone who in any way finances, harbors or defends terrorists is himself a terrorist. We, too, will not make any difference between terrorists and their friends and supporters."  He later criticized Zimbabwe’s independent media for “intimidating state-controlled media” and added that “this kind of media terrorism will not be tolerated.”

Conclusion

As President Bush has correctly asserted, the war against terrorism is not only about military action, it is also about ideas and ideals.  As the United States continues to engage this war, it is sending mixed messages to many African countries.  Rather than awarding governments that seek further democratization, the litmus test is now the willingness of a country to “smoke out” the terrorists.  The problem is that this strategy may have the unintended consequence of making regimes less democratic and to co-opt the fear of terror as a means to limit political opposition.

Equally important is the political and economic development of African countries. In a political environment where poverty, disease, refugees, and weak states persist, the likelihood of the establishment of terror networks increases.  Whether through development aid, military aid, humanitarian assistance to refugees, or more aggressive diplomacy, the United States must do more to address the conditions that facilitate terrorism. Unfortunately, given the war with Iraq, this will be more difficult as the United States has fewer resources to spend on these issues.  As President Bush recently stated, the United States may never “win” the war on terror.  If this is the case, it is important to consider the long-run implications that the current policies have on developing countries in Africa and throughout the world.