Professor Casey Dominguez publishes new book "Commander in Chief"
The Department of Political Science and International Relations is pleased to announce the recent publication of Commander in Chief: Partisanship, Nationalism, and the Reconstruction of Congressional War Powers by Professor and Chair of Political Science and International Relations Casey Byrne Knudsen Dominguez, PhD.
Dr. Dominguez’s book, published on May 8, delves into the constitutional balance of war powers and the evolving relationship between Congress and the president. Her 13 years of meticulous research and dedication have resulted in an insightful piece that dives into American politics, constitutional law and the separation of congressional powers as it relates to the role of commander in chief of the United States.
Dr. Dominguez’s book release comes just as she is finishing up her first year as chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations. Her incredible leadership, dedication and academic contributions have made, and continue to make, an impact on faculty, students and staff. The department is deeply appreciative and proud of all the incredible work she has achieved. Congratulations Dr. Dominguez!
Book Synopsis
“The constitutional balance of war powers has shifted from Congress to the president over time. Today, presidents broadly define their constitutional authority as commander in chief. In the nineteenth century, however, Congress was the institution that claimed and defended expansive war power authority. This discrepancy raises important questions: How, specifically, did Congress define the boundaries between presidential and congressional war powers in the early republic? Did that definition change, and if so, when, how, and why did it do so?
Based on an original, comprehensive dataset of every congressional reference to the commander in chief clause from the Founding through 1917, Casey Dominguez’s Commander in Chief systematically analyzes the authority that members of Congress ascribe to the president as commander in chief and the boundaries they put around that authority.
Dominguez shows that for more than a century, members of Congress defined the commander in chief’s authority narrowly, similar to that of any high-ranking military officer. But in a wave of nationalism during the Spanish-American War, members of Congress began to argue that Congress owed deference to the commander in chief. They also tended to argue that a president of their own party should have broad war powers, while the powers of a president in the other party should be defined narrowly. Together, these two dynamics suggest that the conditions for presidentially dominated modern constitutional war powers were set at the turn of the twentieth century, far earlier than is often acknowledged.”