Contrasting Motives, Comparable Rationales: A Constructivist Examination of Haredi and Palestinian Dis/Engagement in the Israel Defense Forces

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Abstract-

Within the highly volatile and politically contentious region of Israel/Palestine, renowned the world over for its protracted, seemingly endless conflict between Arab and Jewish residents, there exists a lesser known, but perhaps none less quarrelsome, societal fault line entirely internecine in scope, exclusively encompassing different factions of Jews. Extant as an extremely devout and culturally insular community within Israeli society, the Haredim, or ‘ultra-Orthodox’ Jews, comprising some eight percent of the total populace according to the Pew Research Center in 2015, are noted for their shunning of much of the modern world in favor of total immersion in traditional religiosity, rejecting engagement with mainline societal institutions, most controversially the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)¹. This arrangement, brokered soon after Israel’s founding in 1948 by founding father David Ben-Gurion as a means of ensuring a convenient political coalition, has engendered substantive controversy in the nation ever since, with many Israelis protesting the seeming inequity of a large swathe of the populace shirking otherwise mandated national service whilst continuing to reap the benefits of citizenship, most notably through state welfare benefits². Purposely forgoing the assimilative, ‘melting pot’ environment of national service over both fears of a loss of identity, as well as ideological and theological opposition to the existence of the nation-state writ large, the Haredi community exist as stark outliers in a nation whereby staunch patriotism formulated through cooperative securitization is the de rigueur norm, and in the eyes of many Israelis only inculcation of this community into the Zionist fold will serve to alleviate hostilities. Coexistent to this challenging phenomenon, there exists the seemingly inexplicable trend of Palestinian Arabs, currently living under Israeli occupation in the West Bank, voluntarily joining the IDF, albeit in relatively miniscule numbers, and actively serving the military apparatus of the state that the near-entirety of the rest of their community visualizes as an oppressive and illegitimate occupying force³. The ironic similarity between these two seemingly dissimilar communities, both radically defying group consensus by engaging in the opposite activity as each other, beggars a more involved analysis, principally through application of a theoretical lens considering the intrinsic role of identity in shaping this decision-making process. Utilizing a constructivist plane of thought, and by meticulously combing through available research on these two groups, this paper hopes to gain a better understanding of this contrasting, yet interwoven trend and aims to realize that which could potentially influence future policy-making on some of the most persistent controversies which plague the region.

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Introduction-

Within the boundaries of the oft-contested Old City of Jerusalem, the famed ‘City of Peace’ for which even the most cursory historical narrative suggests a far more appropriate appellate, amongst the meandering cobblestone streets of neighborhoods steeped in antiquity and the wide, paved boulevards of modern highways and cross-sections, there stands to witness a sight seemingly both peculiar and familiar at the same time, highly apropos to the complicated mélange that is the modern Middle East. On a semi-regular basis, most likely in response to a perceived provocation from governmental officials, or as a semi-generic show of defiance around the date of a major Jewish holiday, throngs of black-hatted, darkly-robed, and long-bearded men take to the streets to raucously demonstrate against what is perceived amongst their coterie to be the ultimate form of injustice, violently clashing with police and military officials in the process and leading to a great deal of societal disruption. These men, belonging to the most rigidly-defined sub-section of the Jewish religion, and known by the handles of ‘ultra-Orthodox’ or ‘Haredi’ Jews, make themselves manifest in droves to state their case on what they perceive to be the most exigent threat facing the cohesion and permanence of their tight-knit community, namely the possibility that their young men will have to abscond rigorous prayer and study at their yeshivas (religious schools), and be forced to serve three-year stints in the Israeli Army alongside the vast majority of other Israeli Jews.

At present, owing to legislation passed by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion soon after Israel’s inception in 1948, the ultra-Orthodox community remains exempt from the broad-based military conscription for which the modern Israeli state gains its battle-ready reputation amongst the world’s nations, but frequent and sustained grievances from both members of the political establishment, as well as ordinary, more secular Israeli citizens, proclaim frustration with the fact that the ultra-Orthodox continue to avoid the responsibilities of citizenship whilst often accepting its rewards (i.e. welfare stipends). However, when this blanket excusal favoring the ultra-Orthodox community was initiated, the circumstances on the ground were significantly different for all parties involved than at present, as Ben-Gurion’s ordinance, initially applied to a maximum of 400 individuals, was initiated with the intention of revitalizing the dying profession of yeshiva study, as the ranks of the ultra-Orthodox community in Europe had recently been decimated by the Holocaust, and with such relatively small numbers it was assumed that this seemingly minor concession would have little impact on the manpower required for the nascent army.\footnote{Bick, Etta. “Lip-service to Service: The Knesset Debates over Civic National Service in Israel, 1977-2007.” Israel Affairs 22.1 (2016) Ebscohost. Web. 2 Feb. 2018. Pgs. 141-2} Unbeknownst to early policy-makers, the rapid fertility rate of the ultra-Orthodox sector, currently numbering some 6.9 children per family as opposed to 3.1 for the rest of Israel.\footnote{Aran, Gideon, Nurit Stadler, and Eyal Ben-Ari. "Fundamentalism and the Masculine Body: The Case of Jewish Ultra-Orthodox Men in Israel." Religion 38.1 (2008): 25-53. Elsevier. Web. 2 Feb. 2018 Pg.35}
Israel, would inevitably ensue concomitantly rapid population growth over the decades, to the extent that the Haredi community now makes up approximately eleven percent of the total population of Israel, as well as eighteen percent of the youth population, boding for even greater influence in the years to follow. Naturally, continuing to exempt an increasingly large demographic from national service, a mandate which already excludes much of the similarly fecund sector of Israeli Arabs, suggests strains on the ability of the Israel Defense Forces to maintain adequate staffing considering the myriad security challenges the nation faces from hostile, neighboring forces. Also, given the collectivist ethos of securitization upheld as a general norm in Israeli society because of the bonds accrued through majoritarian service in the military, societal isolation for these two groups is to be near-expected.

Even though the Arab sector remains largely exempt from conscription, barring the mandated drafting of the Druze community and the odd volunteer, mainly amongst the Bedouin, there exists a marginal, yet still startling, phenomenon present within the opposite Arab population to that of Israel proper; namely between those Palestinian Arabs residing in areas of the West Bank currently under Israeli administration/occupation. Within Palestinian society, whereby embittered views of the Israeli state for its continued, five-decade seizure of land have created a mindset of perpetual resistance serving as a cornerstone of national identity and perceptions of self, there nevertheless are a (very small) number of persons who have decided to buck this overarching societal trend and volunteer to serve as soldiers in the much-maligned IDF, seemingly belying communal instincts in a manner many may deem to be almost treasonous. Numbering no more than 3,000 individuals at maximum out of the 1.3 million citizens of the Palestinian Territories, these seemingly rogue volunteers defy reductive categorization and basic stereotyping, and are listed on record as expressing a variety of differing motives for their decisions, ranging from pure material gain of money, housing and land for certain recruits, and an explicit psychological desire for acceptance amongst an overarching Israeli and Jewish socio-cultural paradigm amongst others, and can thus cannot be defined specifically as leaning in either direction. Excluding whatever rationales serve to ostensibly buttress army service, the fact still remains that these individuals serve as a league unto their own in defying perhaps the most fundamental societal expectations placed upon them from within the Palestinian community, and the relative scarcity of research and analysis engaged upon by scholars on this phenomenon, admittedly marginal as it may be, (Rhoda Kanaaneh’s *Surrounded: Palestinian Soldiers in the Israeli Military* being a staunch

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9 Ibid. Pg. 3
exception to the rule), perhaps beggars a much more involved examination than has ever been broached before, necessitating the rationale that these disparate motivations need to be understood to get a better grasp of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict writ large.

Of course, it is all well and good to merely speculate on said motivations for these two communities regarding their relationship to Israeli military service, with basic logical skills having the potentiality to deduce why those within the ultra-Orthodox community shun participation in the military of the world’s only Jewish state, or why certain young Palestinian Arabs would do an about-face on fundamental community stipulations and conversely enlist against all odds, but without a rigorous inculcation in theoretical postulations, our assumptions do not hold muster in the halls of academia. Metaphorically gazing at the two main pillars of thought in the school of international relations theory, these pillars being the dichotomous ideological wings of realism and liberalism, very little energy is expended by theoreticians on more holistic aspects of ‘being’ in matters that cannot be easily quantified in material figures. Therefore, one must look ‘outside the box’ of these self-assumed arbiters of perception to gain a cohesive understanding of ‘being’ in terms of factors such as inherent group and individual identity, the role of external historical and cultural forces on influencing persons and collectives, and the way in which normative trends in societies impact human behavior, with analysis dealing with these factors thus needing to branch out into the ‘Third Way’ of political theorizing, namely the upstart school of ideological constructivism. Ascribed astutely by one constructivist theorist as being the ‘paradigm of paradigms’ for political thought, and reflecting on matters sociological to the same extent as it deals with the realm of politics, constructivism negates the notion that humanity is exclusively motivated by physical gains through such factors as increasing profit and consolidating power, noting how unique cultural norms, molded by a myriad of factors past and present, often define decision making in scenarios which would defy ostensible rationality. Individuals are implacably consigned to what is often termed ‘identity politics’ by the simple, fundamentally psychological pull of resorting back to the norms and strictures inculcated within them by their host culture from birth, giving provenance and power to the notion that ideas and mindsets derivative of said inculcation have weighted strength amongst policy makers in any given society, and are often the crux of why core decisions on matters of the utmost importance are realized in the manner which they are. When a broader understanding of groups such as that of the ultra-Orthodox are attained, understanding that the theoretical underpinnings of resistance to military service originate from a theologically-originated anti-Zionism, brokered by the belief that a Jewish state cannot be

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11 Ibid Pg. 123
acceptably brought into existence until after the emergence of the Jewish Messiah, perceptions thus become clearer, and explanatory justifications for what may seem at face value to be a quixotic and ironic communal gesture amongst the Haredim are thus rationalized. However, a constructivist plane of thought may encounter some difficulties in elucidating the justification for why young Palestinians would go against every communal prohibition against collaboration with the inimical Israelis and make the leap into volunteering to serve Israel’s hated military apparatus, the metaphorical engine powering the occupation of Palestinian land, as many of the interviewed recruits have expressed motivations that were purely material, desiring the incentives of money, housing, land, and even more incidental rewards, such as discounted movie tickets. Therefore, constructivism at face value cannot serve as a panacea for automatically figuring out one’s questions and concerns regarding the thorny issue of Israeli military service, making it essential that a more exhaustive examination of constructivist postulations and caveats is engaged upon and utilized accurately to cogently grasp the core question of ‘why’ these two disparate, yet seemingly interwoven communal actors each react to the IDF in contrarian, though remarkably similar, manners.

Conscription as Societal Cleavage-

When initially ascribed to only a small minority of individuals for whom public sympathies ran high in the wake of what was perhaps the largest-scale incidence of mass murder in recorded human history, the draft exemptions provided to the Haredim attracted virtually no recorded controversy when initiated by the Ben-Gurion administration, and was not deemed to be an exigent security threat or a drain upon precious state resources. As such, this status quo would last for approximately twenty-nine years throughout the length of uninterrupted Mapai (Labor) party administrations, with all public debate about the role of the ultra-Orthodox sector being muted in the background of two major wars (Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War), and the challenges then met by territorial annexation considering these wars’ successes. However, 1977 would foment a tidal wave of change within the Israeli nation because of that year’s election, in which Mapai would be removed from power and supplanted with the politically rightist forces of Menachem Begin and his newly formed Likud (Consolidation) party, this sweeping ideological and systemic change near-immediately begetting radical policy shifts in dealing with the ultra-Orthodox sector. Having been brought to power via a voting coalition of the demographics that had been neglected and under-represented in prior Labor governments, namely religious Jewry and the ethnic Mizrahim/Sephardim

(Jews of Mediterranean and Middle Eastern origin), the newly-elected forces of the Likud would quickly get to work formatting policies enfranchising these constituencies. As a ploy to get the ultra-Orthodox political parties, then a peripheral element in Israeli politics, to join together with a Likud governing coalition, a ploy which was ultimately successful, Begin would bring to the table policy emendations which would expand upon the then-static quotas for draft excusals for the Haredim, and broadening the qualifications for excusal to part-time as well as full time yeshiva students, allowances of deferrals for formerly secular Jews who had embraced an ultra-Orthodox lifestyle (known as the Baal Teshuva), the totality of which would potentially quadruple those individuals who were able to avoid enlistment. From the moment when these proposals were initially raised in the Knesset (Israel's parliament), vitriol would emerge from the newly minority left faction, representing the former status quo of the secular and the Ashkenazim (Jews of European origin), over this seemingly favoritism to a community being granted exceptions from a fundamental societal obligation to be endured by the rest of Israel’s Jews, thus initiating the debate that would continue to burn bright for decades to come and into the present, as the Israeli state would see a 3750% increase in deferments over the following twenty-five years. With no ceiling on the number of Haredim who would be granted excusals, adapted from the figure of 800 amended from the original 400 in 1968, the first inklings of concern by broader segments of Israeli society began to be aired for the first time in public forums, and would only augment in profligacy as the effects of unlimited deferment began to manifest themselves.

Simmering on the surface of Israeli public debate from this precipice point onward, the newly arisen controversy over ultra-Orthodox draft exemptions would nonetheless remain relatively quiet and unpronounced as a societal rift until approximately the latter years of the 1990’s going into the twenty-first century, careening off the back of one charismatic politician’s personality and party which appropriated latent hostilities from a secularist ‘Silent Majority’ to advance itself within the halls of governance. Tommy Lapid, a former journalist and outspoken polemicist, would capitalize on the relative popularity and name-brand recognition he had come to enjoy amongst the general Israeli public in order to affix himself within a then moribund party in the Knesset going under the handle of Shinui (Change), and re-orientate its precepts to that of a single-issue political force; namely one designed to combat and reverse the societal advances and influence of the Haredi sector. Despite making efforts to belie the notion that Shinui was solely focused on beating back the metaphorical black-hatted throngs

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15 Ibid Pg. 66
impinging on an idealized secular and democratic Israel, the track record of Shinui and Lapid’s campaigning would speak for itself, as repeated stump speeches devoted to excoriating ‘the usurious exploitation of the state’s coffers for religious purposes’ clearly hammered home the point of Lapid’s political dalliance to the demographic for which he wished to cater towards\(^\text{18}\). Taking the mantle of authenticity of Jewish identity away from its most religious adherents, Lapid successfully steered Shinui to a six-seat win in the 1999 Knesset elections, and later to a fifteen-seat win in 2003, by harping upon the grievance that the ultra-Orthodox, with their influence cast upon Israel’s political and governance systems through effects such as the draft exemptions and laws prohibiting business done on the Sabbath, were unacceptable burdens on the lives and livelihood of the majority\(^\text{19}\). Often infusing his parliamentary rhetoric with hyperbolic verbiage, with the expressed purpose of inciting anger against the Haredim, and therefore support for his cause, Lapid would make accusations that the ultra-Orthodox ‘traded in the blood’ of more secular youngsters made to enlist by continuing to evade service, language which certain scholars of Jewish studies worryingly drew parallels to anti-Semitic depictions of Jewry in prior eras\(^\text{20}\). Muting his positioning on other issues, such as economic neoliberalism and a mealy-mouthed uns sureness to the peace process, Lapid nevertheless found his niche by highlighting a societal gulf which had gone largely unexamined by those in the public consciousness, exclaiming aloud what had previously only been discussed in private, hushed tones and giving secular politicians of all political stripes, from left to right to center (Shinui’s positioning) the fortitude to excoriate the Haredim publicly as a means of attracting sympathy and votes.

Despite leftist parties like Meretz (Vigor) and their rightist cohorts such as Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel Our Home) appropriating the Haredi draft issue, and indeed all societal qualms that could be chalked up to the gap in religiosity between the Haredim and other Jews, it was to be a patrilineal succession in Israeli politics which would come to shape the secularist-religious debate up to the present day following the eventual passing of Tommy Lapid in 2008\(^\text{21}\). Lapid’s son Yair, a fellow media personality who previously gained acclaim as being the host of Israel’s most popular late-night talk show, would jettison his television career in 2013 and coalesce a cadre of aspiring politicians to form a new political party, Yesh Atid (There Is A Future), which would have as one of its main planks a refusal to coalesce in the Knesset with ultra-Orthodox political parties and the formation of a


\(^{19}\) Ibid. Pg. 14


mandate to repeal draft exemptions for the Haredim. Once again attesting to the saliency of this synagogue-and-state debate within the hearts and minds of the voters, Yesh Atid proved to be quite successful, as similarly emotive rhetoric to that of his father (often using the expression 'My fellow slaves' when addressing the perceived burden the Haredim were on the welfare rolls) was utilized to great effect both during the campaigning process and in imbroglios with ultra-Orthodox politicians once ensconced in the Knesset. It could thus be said that Yesh Atid’s modus operandi was to further enlarge the gulf between secular and religious in the same way rightist Jewish politicians and those from the Arab sector had aggrieved tensions between communities as a selling point for their political manifestos, giving secular Israelis aggrieved with a perceived intrusion of religion on their livelihoods a political party and agenda they could unequivocally claim for their own. Notwithstanding this specialized constituency of politically moderate, non-religious types, the way in which the Israeli political system is engendered necessitates formation of coalitions, as well as generalized cooperation, across the ostensible political aisle to other parties, interests, and ideologies in a way which would counteract perceived common sense in most other parliamentary democracies. Despite Yesh Atid’s no-exceptions credo towards including ultra-Orthodox parties in any idealized alliance, a stipulation unswervingly upheld, Zionist parties only marginally less devout than the Haredim soon served to become natural allies. HaBayit HaYehudi (The Jewish Home), a right wing, some might argue far-right, political party headed by former venture capitalist Naftali Bennett, generally representing the interests of the residents of the controversial Israeli settlements in the West Bank, could generally be deemed as being Orthodox/Modern Orthodox in religious orientation, reflecting the faith patterns of the party’s targeted constituents and the party’s leader. Yet in line with its hyper-Zionist allegiances, expressing an effusive affection for the Israeli military and other agents of force for the state as is common amongst rightist politics the world over, the continued aversion of the Haredim to service was anathema to the party’s values, and thus The Jewish Home would make strange bedfellows with secularists across the political spectrum in seeing that this seeming inequity was resolved once and for all. Yesh Atid, with a similarly non-committal stance on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as that of its progenitor Shinui, would find appeal from the hard-liners of Bennett’s party in seeking a more leftward (not hard to accomplish) political party from which mutualistic collaboration on the Haredi draft issue could be conceived and implemented, in a manner which failed to

24 Ibid Pg. 248
alienate either represented constituency from either of the two parties\textsuperscript{25}. Although there were commonalities as well in other facets of policy, primarily regarding domestic quandaries rather than Bennett’s rejectionist attitude toward concessions to the Palestinians, it would primarily be a shared suspicion to ultra-Orthodox intentions over not mutualistically partaking in the burden of military service which would bind these two parties together for Yesh Atid’s two-year long prominence in the Knesset from 2013-15. Despite setbacks in representation from the snap 2015 Knesset election, Yair Lapid and his party still sound the preeminent clarion call on voicing dissuasion with the legal barriers preventing universal conscription, extolling the recent September 2017 Israeli Supreme Court verdict which attempted, yet failed, to invalidate the draft exemption for ‘turning the ship toward sanity and values’, alongside chastising Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for making ‘suckers’ out of the non-Haredi public through his finagling with ultra-Orthodox parties to keep deferments in place\textsuperscript{26}. Still serving as an issue riling up either side of the clearly delineated dichotomy between secular and religious individuals, IDF draft exemptions for the ultra-Orthodox community exist as one of the primary ‘wedge’ issues in contemporary Israeli politics, and to understand the fundamentals behind its origination is to gain a much clearer understanding of the interlinked societal and theological components which have shaped, and will continue to shape, the state of Israel for years to come.

Case Study-Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox Community-

Gazing upon the Haredim solely through a contemporary lens, unaware of the historical paradigms and processes of internal evolution which begat the community famed for its peculiarity today, one immediately notices several jarring trends and figures acquired from studies in demography delineating an undeniable uniqueness, coupled with potential population stressors, upon the Israeli nation at present and for the future. Boasting a four percent growth rate, a ninth of the total population, and yet only an eight percent representation in the annals of employment, underpinning the fact that many Haredim remain voluntarily jobless to engage in either religious study or child-rearing, the ultra-Orthodox may initially seem to confirm stereotypical assumptions by hostile elements within Israeli society; serving as a demographic time bomb and a drag on the welfare system all in one fell swoop\textsuperscript{27}. Cloistered away from the morass of the less devout


Jewish public from early childhood through a parallel, state-funded education system, delineated into two rivaling networks which in tandem teach approximately 76% of Haredi youth from elementary to high school ages, with only 19% of Haredim pursuing post-secondary study, the community is thus reared in a pronouncedly different manner than other Israelis and thus becomes isolated from broader societal trends, only enhancing alienation28. Understandably such given the community’s widespread unemployment, impoverishment is rife amongst the ultra-Orthodox, with a majority (52%) living below the poverty line, in contrast to the general 19% rate in Israel writ large, and concomitantly suffering all the burdens associated, such as housing and food insecurity, yet at the same time enjoying some of the highest rates of general satisfaction with life of any demographic within Israel, double that of the population average29. Simultaneously renouncing modern Israel, with its trappings of secularism and liberalism, yet taking an active part in forming the character of the state owing to such a sizable demographic pull, the Haredim differ from other self-isolating religious communities, such as the Amish in America, by actively seeking to impose religiosity and their interpretation of what traditional customs and values are to the broader Jewish community, whilst still maintaining an aura of isolation from general society for the sake of cultural preservation30. As much as the prism of self-identification within ultra-Orthodoxy is centered around all-encompassing faith, equally coupled to a sense of ‘being’ for Haredi individuals is ethnic origination, as a deep chasm exists between Haredim of Ashkenazi and Sephardic ancestry, a divisor which segments itself down into modes of dress, particularistic customs, separate synagogues and educational facilities, and even differing political parties for those who find partaking in government amenable to their beliefs, with ethnic Ashkenazim supporting the United Torah Judaism party, in contrast to the communal allegiance ethnic Sephardim hold towards the Shas party31. For each of these two groups, ethnicity and religion are a modus vivendi in and of themselves, with separate but equal lures toward the individual by the collective that overtake any inkling of individualism within its constituent members between such tightly-knit, isolationist subcultures, especially given an environment so charged in identity-oriented politics as Israel32. While strictly not a religious niche party like United Torah Judaism, counting more secular ethnic Sephardim/Mizrahim who vote communally out of a sense of societal

29  Ibid Pg. 16
32  Ibid. Pg. 114
expectation, Shas has its institutional origination in the rabbinical councils and associated organizations for their ethnic communities which are clearly ultra-Orthodox in their level of piety, but given the discrepancies in religiosity amongst its supporters, Shas trades more heavily on its ancestral rooting than the assumed Ashkenazi UTJ, which is able to inflect more control over its smaller band of followers due to broader commonality. Given that the Haredi experience within Israel, and indeed within the Jewish diaspora as a whole, is overwhelmingly associated with the cultural mores, historical grounding, and manifest presence of ultra-Orthodox Jews of Ashkenazi origin, the coverage provided in this paper to ethnic Sephardi/Mizrahi Haredim will be limited for reasons of remaining concise and oriented to a more narrow topic at hand, although occasional references to these communities may emerge when requisite. The primary reason for this dichotomy between Haredim owes to those vastly different histories, separated by geographic distance and the localized relationships that differing Jewish communities had under the various peoples for which they were subject to, and it was only under the specific circumstances found in the shtetls (ghettos) of Eastern Europe in the 19th century by which what we now term to be Haredi Judaism could have arisen as a prominent Jewish subculture and a force to be reckoned with.

Existing as an originally syncretic, somewhat mystical movement from the late 1600’s on in the environs of present-day Poland, Haredi, or Hasidic, Judaism was motivated by a fundamentalist-originated purge from certain rabbis and scholars that aimed at revitalizing what was deemed a lost purity and originality to the faith, guided by now-revered figureheads such as the Baal Shem Tov. Factually, much of what was deemed by these holy men to be ‘forgotten’ may have been based largely on biased self-inclination, as the period preceding the Haskalah (Enlightenment) of the mid-1800’s ensured that the entirety of European and world Jewry was firmly wedded to traditional precepts and rigorous religiosity, but with the advent of Jewish secularism, and its necessitation of other methods of delineating identity, the first substantive cleavages between the Haredim and other members of the broader community would begin to erupt. Allured by the trappings of modernization and the (unsuccessful) promise that anti-Semitism would dissipate following assimilation into broader, Western society, the Haskalah substantially changed the lifestyles of hundreds of thousands of persons within European Jewry who were no longer content with submitting to the omniscient specter of an all-seeing God demanding rigid obedience to every minute facet of religious strictures. However, secularism was not intended, by even its most fervent advocates, of supplanting ‘Jewishness’ in its entirety, but rather was intended to redefine what it essentially meant to be Jewish in a manner not entirely dependent on faith, mimicking the broader European trend of nationalism fencing in persons as belonging to specific ‘tribes’ contingent on the

borders of newly-formed nation-states. As a logical derivative of this line of thinking, it was to be assumed that the ‘nation’ of Jews, dispersed around the corners of the world since the destruction of the Second Temple, thus needed a country of their own to ‘elevate’ their place among the myriad peoples responsible for marginalizing Jewry past and present, attributing dis-cohesion as being inextricable from victimhood\textsuperscript{35}. Near instantaneously amongst those Jews still true to the old-fashioned way of life, the rapid pace of change which was being both theorized and implemented in the lives of European Jewry was entirely antithetical to the intransigent demands placed upon them from on high, and vehement rejection of even the faintest inkling of modernization on dictates commanded from the texts of the Torah and Talmud would be issued, to little manifest effect, by the leading rabbis and community leaders, particularly on the newfangled notion of Jews needing their own nation\textsuperscript{36}. Disregarding all this, the ‘liberated’ Jews as of late persevered with this unique nationalism, now going under the handle of Zionism after an ancient Hebrew name for the land of Israel, and it would be precisely this location, assumed by leading Zionist theorist and author Theodor Herzl to be ‘a land without a people for a people without a land’, that would serve as the idealized locality for the majority of Zionists to envision as a safe haven for their long-suffering brethren\textsuperscript{37}.

Within a handful of years following these initial discussions, small, emigratory groupings of particularly zealous Zionists would indeed step foot on the then barren, desolate backwater of the Ottoman Empire for the purposes of manifesting their wildest dreams into a lived reality, setting up a multitude of agricultural communes across the broadly-defined territory of Palestine in the name of fundamentally retooling Jewry from a perceived bookish, insular race to that of a virile, proactive nation newly immune from the ravages of persecution\textsuperscript{38}. Those Jews who disabused these seemingly fantastical notions, still the clear majority throughout Europe at the time, either chose to ‘work within the system’ of their respective nation-states to advance communal well-being, if they were ‘emancipated’, or, in the case of the now-clearly defined ultra-Orthodox sector, chose to keep within their narrow communes of familiarity to practice their faith as they saw fit, trusting that the Almighty would shield them from the harm anti-Semites could mete out. Excepting a trickle of ultra-Orthodox Jews who did migrate to Palestine in the mid-to-late 1800’s to have a lived experience of religiosity in the Holy Land, the Haredi community was to remain firmly wedded to their diasporic locales for the time being, unaware of the eventual tidal wave of genocidal hatred which would erupt in a few decades time with the

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. Pg. 32
rise of Adolf Hitler in the 1930’s\textsuperscript{39}. Come the turn of the twentieth century, Zionism, as seemingly all social movements inevitably do, fractionalized into several competing, inimical factions with pronouncedly differing ideas as to how the envisioned revitalization of the Jewish people was to manifest itself, and it was from this division that the first intimations of faith, previously cast aside as a relic and a burden upon Jews by early Zionists, became interwoven in this aspirational project for nationhood. According to the school of Revisionist Zionism, politically rightist in contrast to the socialism of the mainline movement, figures like Ze’ev Jabotinsky, himself a secularist, nonetheless insisted that since the doctrines of Judaism were an ineffable bond which had united the Jewish people since the days of Abraham, religion, to whatever extent feasible, had to serve as at least a marginally important component of any revitalized Jewish nationhood going forward, not countenancing the theory that Judaism was an inevitable impediment to this grand national dream\textsuperscript{40}. To the ultra-Orthodox, repulsed by the rank atheism of figures like Herzl from the get-go, this newly interwoven accommodation for faith was no elixir for what ailed the Jewish masses, still viewing it the utmost form of heresy to foment an ostensibly Jewish country before the expressed permission of the awaited Messiah, whose arrival would predicate the migration of Jews as a whole to the Holy Land whereby God’s Kingdom on Earth would be established\textsuperscript{41}. As what was to become the state of Israel in eventualty blossomed beyond merely a handful of cooperative farming outposts, developing towns and cities, modern infrastructure, and a culture predicated on liberalist, European-esque values and the Hebrew language, for which the ultra-Orthodox considered heretical in any non-liturgical use. The boundaries enumerating difference between increasingly secular Jewish masses and the sects of the Haredim became more pronounced, and it was to be the position of the Haredim which would eventually be downgraded to the minority viewpoint regarding Jewish settlement in Palestine\textsuperscript{42}. With Zionism becoming more institutionalized as a mainstay in Jewish thought and Jewish livelihood, mutualistic stigma between Haredim and their Zionist counterparts would only enhance and become more vitriolic in tone, as reformist-minded Zionists, including the likes of Jabotinsky and the Revisionists who were more sympathetic to religious practice, would utilize the power of pen and paper to castigate these supposed ‘parasites’ who were responsible for holding back universal advancement of world Jewry by their clinging on to seemingly antiquated customs and belief systems\textsuperscript{43}. Inversely, learned men amongst the ultra-Orthodox would utilize the power of hyperbole to berate Zionist ‘heretics’ through

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid. Pg. 55
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid. Pg. 31
the biting accusation that they were amongst the worst enemies of the Jewish people writ large owing to their rejection of divine mandates, a particularly powerful declamation in a world in which Jews were seemingly surrounded by a multitude of adversaries braying for their blood\textsuperscript{44}. Not being able to grasp the theological rationales for why the Haredim were so viscerally opposed to this grand resettlement project in the Holy Land, Zionists both secular and religious would inevitably consign Haredim to the scrap heap of history despite their contemporary presence as living, vibrant communities, and the ultra-Orthodox would interchangeably consign less devout Jews sympathetic to Zionist ideals as being near-infidels in practice, furthering their already bleak state of alienation from the clear majority of world Jewry and thus begetting the intransigence between differing factions of Jews visible up to the present day.

**Reasons for Rejectionist Philosophy-**

Persisting to this day amongst admittedly small, yet nevertheless present and outspoken pockets of ultra-Orthodox Jewry, religious anti-Zionism poses somewhat of a logical conundrum to outside observers ignorant of every little nuance in ideology within the particularistic sects espousing such views, beggaring the puzzling question of why the most devout of Jewish individuals would be adamantly opposed to the existence of what is generally viewed as an established safe haven for the world’s Jews, namely the state of Israel. After the trials and tribulations faced by the Jewish people during the approximately 5,000 years spent extant as a cohesive people, and particularly so after the murder of 1/3rd of the world’s Jewish population in the Holocaust, universality in opinion amongst Jews that a solidly-defined, well-protected nation-state would serve as the best vanguard for ensuring the validity of the motto ‘Never Again’, would appear to be self-evident, but this has not entirely been the case. Within Haredi Judaism, discounting formerly non-Zionist factions like the Chabad-Lubavitch organization that have since become passionately Zionist, two main dynastic communities, the influential and multitudinous Satmar branch of Hasidism, and the more radical, left-field fringe organization of the Neturei Karta, have become principally defined, both within their own ranks and from outside observers, by their continued negation of the validity of Israel as being the Jewish nation-state and the ostensible vox populi for the interests of global Jewry, with said stalwart positioning from both factions leading to internecine rancor between Jews dismayed at the rejection of a core pillar of their identity.

To begin with the more marginal and extremist of these two groups, the Neturei Karta, famed in certain circles for going above and beyond in not only rejecting Israel’s existence, but in actively aligning themselves with the Palestinian solidarity movement internationally and cavorting with avowed enemies of Israel, such as the Holocaust-

denying Iranian President Ahmadinejad, are often held up as being the sole example of Jewish anti-Zionism due to their vocalism and peripheral status amongst the world’s Jews\textsuperscript{45}. Yet, the group still possesses a unique historical grounding and contemporary relevance in this debate for which any analysis on the ultra-Orthodox, particularly one on ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionism, would be remiss to exclude. Established in Jerusalem in 1935 by Rabbi Amran Blau, a man of Hungarian origin who had settled in British Palestine as part of the proportionally small migration of ultra-Orthodox to the Holy Land, Neturei Karta, the name meaning ‘Guardians of the City’ in the ancient language of Aramaic for which the Talmud was written in, began as a protest faction against the Agudah, the main body representing religious Jewry in the land at the time, seemingly becoming too amiable, and too cooperative, with the Zionist interests they were ostensibly still opposed to\textsuperscript{46}. Retaining their vehement anti-Zionism even throughout the course of World War II, with all the revealed knowledge of genocidal persecution of Jews trickling down gradually to international audiences, the Neturei Karta went into crisis mode come the initial United Nations vote on the partition of Palestine in 1947, sending emissaries to said body and other international organizations and governments pleading them to vote against the formation of the Jewish state, an absolute about-face on what most other Jewish organizations were doing at the time\textsuperscript{47}. Obviously, these efforts were unsuccessful come 1948, but said step-back would not deter the Neturei Karta, who would curry favor with Arab governments over the following decades, to the point of even having their then-chief rabbi Moshe Hirsch appointed ‘Jewish liaison’ to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)\textsuperscript{48}. Grounding their anti-Zionism under the auspices of not wanting to provoke ‘the nations’ (non-Jews) into engaging in violence against Jewish communities the world over through a presumably presumptuous independence declaration opposed by many, the Neturei Karta can be defined as taking a passive approach toward dealing with the outside world in an era in which an embittered global Jewish community was deciding to forcibly assert itself in perhaps the first major instance of mass communal reaction responding to the atrocities out of Europe\textsuperscript{49}. With the Neturei Karta still holding strong to their original anti-Zionist precepts to this day, the immense daylight between the organization and many Jews remains emblematic of the lack of unanimity within world Jewry as it stands and has stood for millennia, standing contrarian to popularized assumptions and stereotyped notions from outsiders.


\textsuperscript{47} Ibid. Pgs. 36-7

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid. Pg. 40

Even if one were to discard the Neturei Karta as an extremist, implacably uncompromising band of radicals, who have been emphatically disavowed and protested against by mainline Jewish organizations and individuals of all stripes, the fact remains that the Neturei Karta do not serve as the be-all and end-all of Orthodox Jewish anti-Zionism, for to consign them as such would negate the historical legacy and modern eschatology of several other Haredi sects which uphold a distancing from the modern state of Israel as crucial to their lived reality of what it means to be Jewish. As a primary case in point to said adage, the largest and arguably most influential of all these groupings, the Satmar Hasidim, named for the Romanian village of Satu Mare whereby they originated, serve as primary actors in the Orthodox Jewish communities of Israel, America, and Europe largely in spite of their anti-Zionism, owing to sheer population size and the command that the Teitelbaum patriarchal dynasty has over the sect which they administer, and it is from the influence of Satmar by which a majoritarian share of Haredi hostility toward Zionist ideals is made manifest. Headquartered in Brooklyn, New York after having suffered devastating losses in its Eastern European homeland during the Holocaust, the Satmar sect, not unlike its counterparts in the Neturei Karta, reacted to the loss of the six million not through a resolved determination to seek refuge in the Zionist project as had many other Jews, but would instead cast further dispersions on the Zionist movement as being somehow contributory to the plight of Jews in Europe, envisioning a grand conspiracy between Zionist leaders and Nazi officials to build a state off the backs of the massacred. This seemingly grandiose notion, which many Holocaust survivors would take as deeply offensive and dismissive of their traumatic experiences, nevertheless was part and parcel of the genuine zealousness by which the Satmar Haredim conducted every aspect of their daily lives in accordance with an incredibly strict interpretation of Biblical texts, engendered as much to keep outside influences upon their flock at bay as it was a form of genuine devotion to the precepts of the Torah. Explicating further on the accusations fomented nearly as soon after the news from Europe broke loose, Rabbi Moshe Teitelbaum, the head of the Satmar dynasty from the immediate post-war era to his death in 2006, would compose a tractate throughout much of the latter half of the 1950’s entitled ‘Vayoel Moshe’ (And Moses Agreed), whereby Teitelbaum would take largely anecdotal, word-of-mouth accounts from like-minded followers detailing perceived Zionist collaboration with Hitler’s forces and combine them with a theological exegesis on the moral failing of secular Zionists to create a work upheld as ineffable gospel by the sect’s followers to this day. Insinuating that Zionist leaders in Palestine, Europe, and America knew beforehand of the ‘Final Solution’ and chose to actively expedite its occurrence rather than impede its machinations, based on a supposed self-loathing for the traditional Judaism of European Jews and to further sympathy for the upcoming Jewish

state in the Holocaust’s aftermath, Rabbi Teitelbaum in essence believed that the supposed Zionist facilitators of this plan were ultimately more evil than Hitler’s forces themselves, as they would essentially disguise their Jew-hatred in contrived concern for Jewish welfare\(^\text{52}\). However, historians looking from outside the incontrovertibly biased vantage point of the Satmar sect generally assign the blame of the repeated and failed rescue opportunities that had occurred during this period to a lackluster concern for Jewish well-being by the Allied nations of America and Britain. In this scope, the latter was particularly culpable in the demise of millions owing to its limiting of entry visas for aspiring Jewish migrants to Palestine, on the grounds than an influx of European Jewry would cause strife amongst the Arab residents of the region and would complicate partition plans for the two populations. Preceding even these years of mass murder, Rabbi Teitelbaum ascribed the blame on Zionist leaders as dating back all the way to the immediate aftermath of Hitler’s inauguration as German Chancellor in 1933, whereby the boycotts in which Jewish organizations engaged worldwide in against Germany in protest were viewed by Teitelbaum as an unnecessary provocation that further angered the Nazis to the point of inculcating genocidal feelings that were heretofore non-existent\(^\text{53}\). Such brazen accusations, which would indisputably be deemed a form of anti-Semitic historical revisionism if they were uttered by a non-Jewish observer, are still upheld as a communal credo by followers of the Satmar Rebbe as both an explanatory rationale for what transpired during that painful epoch and a condemnatory scold directed at more secular Jews, including other, fellow Orthodox sects who take a less doctrinaire stance on Zionism, in a manner seemingly against the precept that ‘a Jew remains a Jew, even if he has sinned.’\(^\text{54}\) Rationalizing these recently-afflicted horrors through the exact opposite vantage point that the broad morass of Jewry had come to perceive the Holocaust through, these stark differences in opinion and reaction are not necessarily depreciated in meaningfulness simply because of their variance. When existential questions such as the rationalization of the deaths of innocent children are raised by a community more assured of the goodness of God than very few others, the natural, logical conclusion is inevitably to ascribe moral failings to oneself and fellow believers for supposed ‘sins’ committed than to postulate the notion that the benevolent hand of protection from the Almighty was temporarily lifted in a time of crisis, and to blame fellow Jews as being part and parcel of the Nazi death machine thus makes more sense than casting dispersions on one’s deity\(^\text{55}\). As is a common notion with many devoted religious sects, suffering, and the resultant lack of miraculous liberation from one’s troubles, is an expected consequence of residing within the mortal realm, something to be weathered and tolerated under the assurances of faith, with the conditional stipulation that admittance into a paradisiacal afterlife, or in


\(^{53}\)  Ibid. Pg. 702

\(^{54}\)  Ibid. Pg. 704

\(^{55}\)  Ibid. Pg. 713
the case of Haredi Jewry the imminent arrival of the Messiah, is only to be gained from bearing one’s troubles out. Although believed culpability by Jewry in the Holocaust may have seemed an absurd and offensive notion to Jews less tethered to the stipulations of deep religiosity, the theoretical postulations of cultural relativism beget a necessary understanding of what may seem to be strange and contradicting conceptions to the outside observer firmly in the context of the history and lived reality of the group being studied. Owing to the self-isolating status and near-alien character of the Satmar and Neturei Karta sects to an onlooker, even amongst other factions of Jewry, placing all of the constituent components of why the seeming lure of a Jewish state in the ancient Holy Land would fail to appeal to those Jews most steeped in fidelity to the veracity of the Scriptures together becomes a laborious effort in rationalization, but nevertheless a necessity if the question is posed as to ‘why’ these intensely devout Jews lacked a concrete emotional connection to the state of Israel like so many of their other peers.

Theoretical Lens- Constructivism-

While it may be self-evident that basic facts on the theological and ideological ins and outs of ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionism can go some ways toward assuaging our curiosities and doubts on this initially surprising subject matter, they remain sizably inefficient when it comes to the matter of deducing the intrinsic rationales, coded in societal norms that have their epistemological roots in human psychology and the maximization of collective interest, which beget group and individual decisions not to serve in the first place. When one peruses the reams of factually dense and deeply analytical treatises in the realm of international relations theory, a sociological subsect of I.R. dealing with examining the interests and stimuli prompting geo-political decision making, one will soon be frustrated when sticking to the ‘mainline’ theoretical wings of realism and liberalism, as these two main disciplinary credos remain sorely lacking in understanding non-material motives. Therefore, the ‘third way’ of ideological constructivism, negating the commonly-held specification amongst theorists that abstract thought is necessarily at odds with what one, or a collective, aims to achieve in the material world, accredits a pluripotency of different bents of belief equal due, rather than just the ones seemingly in line with rational self-interest. Utilizing a highly multi-faceted methodology taking into consideration equally validated, seemingly contrarian, points of view alongside a scholarly application of descriptive inferences into actions and behaviors expressed explicitly or subtly, ideological constructivists have an often-unacknowledged

upper hand above their more ‘mainline’ counterparts. This is aided in part by a logical handicapping of maximization of theory owing to intransient social realities other theorists cannot grasp\textsuperscript{58}. Alongside these rather unique reflections, constructivists contemplate that the relationship between individuals and societal structures is not merely one-sided, as the general credo goes in other I.R. theoretical wings, but has a mutualistic, dichotomous impact, as persons are adapted to community-based arrangements in much the same manner that these same institutions are responsive to the agency of singular persons\textsuperscript{59}. Ergo, it can be deduced that in the instance of the ultra-Orthodox draft refuser, the natural peer pressure imposed upon the individual young male practitioner by the religious and cultural collective of the Haredi community begets an equal and opposite reaction through each and every willful decision by a singular actor in the field to stick with the status quo and resist conscription, a sort of adaptation of Newton’s third law of motion for the social science sector. To understand the importance of culture, religion, and heritage in the activities and mindsets of singular persons, alongside the mass of the collective, one needs at least a fundamental comprehension of the postulations of constructivism to be able to tie seemingly disparate and peripheral components of one’s identities into a functional narrative which can produce coherent results in the research process.

Attempting to encounter new discoveries in the process of research, which have the underpinned hope of coming across plausible solutions to remediate the world’s multitudinous problems, theoretical constructivists have devoted substantial time and effort into examining and ostensibly ‘breaking down’ instances of conflict and strife on the global stage so that understandings of individual and collective motives can be parsed, and answers to these dilemmas can be obtained, with one of the more blatant examples of such being analysis into the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. In said region of the world, where identities are seemingly impermeable amidst highly contested borders and barriers between the warring two sides, how a person is defined, invariably by their ascribed collective membership rather than through any personal merit, is based upon the land in which they reside and which ‘tribe’ their heritage correlates with, as Jewish individuals residing upon the land generally assumed to be Israeli territory thus become ‘Israelis’ by default, and ethnically Arab persons who reside in the Israeli-occupied territory of the West Bank are automatically defined as ‘Palestinians’. This assumptive line of thinking and categorizing can easily be rationalized by a constructivist approach of dealing with common-place assignation, as said world-view espouses the belief that a ‘social environment’ invariably defines a person, and by extenuation the community of which they are reared in, and can thus go a long way towards answering the fundamental

\textsuperscript{58} Adler, Emanuel. "Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates." Handbook of International Relations. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2013. 112-44. Print. Pg. 122

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid. Pg. 129
questions of ‘what’ and ‘who’ individual communities are as unique units. When both primary faiths at play in this debacle, Judaism and Islam, attribute reverence and divine provenance to the contested land, and when a group such as the Palestinians feel as though the land has been usurped from them as indigenous people, every activity and thought that constitutes being for either community thus becomes an implicit form of self-assertion of the needs and wants of the person and collective, with self-proclaimed ‘leaders’ from both groups mutualistically interpreting the other community’s actions as being intrinsically hostile to their own wellbeing. Placing this into more direct verbiage, through the mindset of the Palestinian people, the past 120-odd years of Jewish incursion into the land of Palestine in the hopes of establishing a Jewish state is perhaps the ultimate depredation on their land, heritage, and culture, and concurrently the Palestinian mindset, manifest into attitudes and behaviors, thus becomes adapted into a permanent mode of reaction toward the existential danger that Zionism poses on their continued existence and well-being as a distinct ‘nation’. Since Israel, famous for its reactive, politically realist-oriented stances toward engaging the Palestinian minority within its borders and their Arab neighbors, likewise deems Palestinian nationhood, with its desire to reclaim the land ‘from the river to the sea’, as an omniscient threat to their own survival, Israel as a collective behaves in the way that it does, and transmutes its evolved culture and values into its constituent ‘Israelis’, solely because of its distinctly unique surroundings. When one deigns to the hypotheses of certain scholars of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, who have come to understand that the sense of nationhood currently possessed by the Palestinian people largely came about in reaction to the newly-imposed nationalism of the Zionists in the land of Palestine, one can begin to understand generalized constructivist comprehensions of national sovereignty. Articulated by theorists such as Rodney Hall, who document a top-down effect of influence on individuals from their constituent nations, it thus becomes easier to realize that the nations of the world effuse explanatory meaning to outsiders implicitly in every aspect of their behavior. Through this logic, nation-states and their citizenry mutually define one another, cause formation, evolution, and actualization of policies, and can be used to explain the conduct of either party merely by noting the symbiosis that either ‘side’ brings into the grand scheme of things. Nationhood, as rationalized by constructivists, can merely be categorized as an institutionalized expression of reactive impulses to one’s surroundings when collated as part of an at-least semi-homogenous grouping of persons, and as applied to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, can go some ways toward rationalizing the seeming intransigence either community has toward the thorny matter of territorial

61 Ibid. Pg. 110
63 Ibid. Pg. 128
holdings coupled with the mutual atavism expressed by representatives from two peoples that seem to have as much in common as they have apart.

Having deviated somewhat from the topic at hand in order to discuss the implications for constructivist theory on the geopolitics of the broader region, it now becomes necessary to apply the lessons learned therein to see how constructivism can aid in deducing the puzzling question of ultra-Orthodox draft refusal in Israel, utilizing the same tropes which could partially figure the at-present war of attrition between Israelis and Palestinians to see if this smaller-scale debacle has a potentiality for conclusion as well. Within the ultra-Orthodox populace, a highly regimented community structuration placing intense demands regarding religious practice and outward expressions of religiosity amongst its membership, it would naturally befit outsiders looking in as a notion that the individual participant is likely to have an implicit resistance to all of these strictures owing to our more laissez-faire rearing, that inside every visibly ultra-Orthodox person is a rebel with modernist inclinations ready to break out\textsuperscript{64}. Yet, as a matter of societal inculcation within this subculture from a very early age, an intense fear of the outside world coupled with a deliberately skewed upbringing that limits all education not immediately necessary to a life of religious devotion, the clear majority of Haredim are very strongly wedded to every minute constriction of their ancestral traditions, not knowing, and often not wanting to understand, what lies beyond the narrow paths for which they have been proscribed since birth. The outside world, often especially so when dealing with the realm of more secular divisions of Jewry, is but a hollow simulacrum of what can be provided to the Haredi individual in the environment of spiritual fulfilment underneath the narrow tent of the religious community, and since the covenants of Abraham and Moses were to be exclusively applied to the Jewish people in this world view, it is baffling to the Haredim that more secular Jews choose to part with the ineffable divine mandate of God. Israel, therefore, founded upon the secularist principles of Zionism, which emphasize corporeal pursuits such as hard labor, athleticism, and a historical narrative of Jewry steeped in an ethno-cultural aegis rather than religious, is thus particularly objectionable to Haredim for bandying about the vagaries of the world while still operating under ‘Jewish’ auspices, and the normalization over time of non-Haredi currents in Judaism is thus deemed a personalistic assault on their very identities\textsuperscript{65}. Indeed, when lecturing young Haredim on the purported dangers of military service upon their religion and culture, ultra-Orthodox elders often compare voluntary enlistment as being akin to suicide, one of the ultimate sins in Jewish theology, and ascribe the same divine punishment and castigation upon Haredi volunteers as said action would result in

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid. Pgs. 34-5
the afterlife. By way of this analogy, one can notice an ironic parallel between the sense of threat that Haredim have toward the perceived encroachment of secularist Zionism upon their cohesiveness and inherent well-being, and the existential feeling more secular Israelis hold toward the asserting of Palestinian national identity, and indeed, these emotions both originate from the same ontological root. The normative understandings which both communities accept as a given in their implicit and explicit worldviews transform any given member of either society into a willful agent, carrying out what is deemed to be requisite to secure group stability, and in turn these agents solidify these community prerequisites and further institutionalize them via their participation. Since the inception of constructivism as a coherent discipline within the realm of I.R. theory, affiliated theorists have postulated this notion as a core stratum of what facilitates stasis and evolution in cultures and societies, alongside other inter-related components such as processes of behavior and their concomitant practices.

Given that the theoretical field of constructivism is relatively modern in provenance, having only emerged as a substantive, well-heeled discipline in international relations theory from approximately the mid-1980’s onward, there still remain gulfs regarding the interpolation of several, at-present disparate postulations dealing with core themes of identity politics past and present. It is from these gaps in comprehension that constructivist theory is deemed to have ‘failed’ in contrast to its more mainline brethren. For example, solidified and assured constructivist interpretations on the meaningfulness and value of the nation-state, nations, and concomitant nationalism are sorely lacking in a manner which can compete rigorously for the hearts and minds of the learned, reflecting on the general constructivist paradigm that frames individuals and their collectives as abstract ‘tribal’ units rather than the more concise framework of national boundaries more convenient to mainline theorists. To be fair, certain rudimentary notions on the nation-state, dealing primarily with countries as symbols of identification for persons inclined to embrace that arbiter of delineation for one’s sense of self, have been brought up and expounded upon to a degree in certain works which have relevancy to the constructivist school, such as in Benedict Anderson’s seminal treatise Imagined Communities. Said work, which casts aside the lived relevancy of nationalism in the minds of its devotees to a modern historical legacy of a rise in secularism, a decline in the omniscience of monarchical governance, and the utilization and homogenization of linguistics in varying realms globally, services to impart rather precise conceptualizations of what belonging to

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68 Ibid. Pg. 123
one of these ‘imagined communities’ we call nation-states comprises and offers to its willing and unwilling affiliates\(^70\). In the specific example of the Jewish people, denied a concrete country of which they could bind a historicity and a uniform affiliation untethered to any other rivaling conceptions of nationhood until very recently in their narrative epoch, the exact rationales for the fomentation of a nationalism during the Romanticist era in Europe were demarcated when nationalities were crystalized, arising in tandem with the secularizing Haskalah, when Jewry bifurcated into the Hiloni (secular) and Haredi factions which have failed to be reconciled to this day\(^71\). Complementary to this trend was the emergence within secularist Zionism of exalting the Hebrew tongue, formerly a heavily guarded, somewhat defunct language used only in liturgical settings, to the status of a lived, vibrant reality for thinking and doing amongst at least a subset of the world’s Jews, in essence stripping the parlance of its theological power and mainlining the information and expressions disclosed therein to the masses, an analogous action to Gutenberg’s printing press mainlining Biblical texts for the masses to interpret as they saw fit\(^72\). While all of these trends were radically altering lived Jewishness for the majoritarian hoi polloi of Jews residing in all corners of the diaspora, the ultra-Orthodox remained, for reason of being true to the stringent stipulations of their specific brand of Judaism, unphased, and only served to be influenced by these transformations through their adamant rejection of every innovative ‘exception to the rule’ propounded by secularist Jewish leaders insistent on broad-sweeping reform of what being Jewish meant\(^73\). Therefore, it can be rationalized, using constructivist postulations, that the decisive logic for the initially confusing standpoint of ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionism is predicated near-solely on the group’s wholesale rejection of ‘modernity’, or perhaps more accurately, ‘adaptation’ of tradition, that deviates from the lifestyles and practice of faith that the near prophetically-reverenced Haredi leadership of rabbis and scholars command as the sole acceptable and truthful ‘way’ for supplication to God. When ‘liberated’ Jews, influenced by the broader societal trend of the Haskalah, began to assert their Jewishness not merely as a practicable religion, but as a history, a contemporaneous cultural paradigm, and as a sense of nationhood in line with the ‘nations’ rather than antagonistically defying them, the ultra-Orthodox would respond by retreating further inward, standardizing rejectionist philosophies as their own lived, unaltered cultural reality up to the present. When other Jews aligned with Zionism and began viewing themselves as a nation, the ultra-Orthodox would do the opposite and assign anti-nationalism as an ineffable article of faith. When other Jews took to the Hebrew language as a mainstream method of communication, the

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ultra-Orthodox would stick to their diasporic Yiddish and vehemently reject usage of Hebrew outside the synagogue walls. What makes the ultra-Orthodox so unique as a cultural and religious group in the modern era derives solely from the community’s indiscriminate casting aside of any and all of the strictures of identity that almost all other societal groups have come to define themselves by, rejecting the evolution over the past few centuries underlined in analyses like *Imagined Communities*, such as a secularist language and a cohesive nation-state with definable boundaries (excepting groups such as the Kurds who still lack this). In league with groups such as the Amish, traditional hierarchical administration and an overwhelming devotion to God as a core arbiter of group singleness rather than borders and culture simply cannot be countenanced with contemporary notions of nationhood, and it is from this rationality that the Haredim disabuse themselves of the Israeli state, despite often living within it, and concurrently reject service in the nation state’s most committed affiliate, the armed forces.

**Case Study-Palestinian Volunteers in the IDF**

So far, much of what has been propounded in this paper has dealt near-completely with the mores, mentality, and active rationalization of a minority group, one nonetheless still tethered to the ostensible ‘mainstream’ of ‘Jewishness’ within Israel, and their refusal, aided and abetted by the state and other authorities, to participate in the grand national project of self-defense known as the Israel Defense Forces. These Haredim, as we have noted previously, lack the internal institutionalization of nationalistic and secularistic tropes because of their community’s historical disconnect from the modernization processes inculcated amongst many of the world’s Jews following the Haskalah, whereby Jewry had the mentality of being ‘one amongst the nations’ encoded into a collective psyche concomitant to other forms of societal disruption. However, as has been stated earlier in reply to predicking caveats, to be able to firmly grasp the grounds for why Israel’s ultra-Orthodox community embark upon this near-universalist noncompliance with the societal expectation of enlistment, going beyond the ultra-Orthodox, or indeed even Israel’s Jews writ large as a research topic, is a necessitude in a world with so many competing ethno-nationalist and cultural interests with overlapping similarities and differences. Closer afield to the maelstrom of Israel as a chaotic, division-riddled geopolitical unit lies the territory, and ethno-nationalist concept, of Palestine, currently under Israeli military administration in the occupied West Bank, alongside governance by the Islamist Hamas party under self-administration in Gaza, and betwixt these two bifurcated domains lie deliberately antithetical administrations that engage their residents in respectively contrarian manners. Dealing exclusively with the West Bank for reasons of condensing this work, the ongoing, and further institutionalized, occupation of Palestinian land by Israel since the successful climax of the Six-Day War in 1967 has bred an omnipresent attitude of resentment and outright resistance in its indigenous population, manifesting itself most plaintively on the world stage with the First and Second Intifadas (Uprisings), and it is taken as a given by domestic and international
observers that a Palestinian will be reared in an environment in which loathing of Israel, specifically its military-industrial complex, is a foreseen conclusion. Excepting a statistically near-insignificant minority, this would prove itself to be the case, but the fact that any minority exists, that would not only not come to automatically hate the state of Israel for its depredations toward Palestine, but would actually volunteer time and effort to serving and facilitating the Israeli state’s goals in the Territories, initially baffles the mind of an observer with even the most superficial conceptualizations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indeed, despite what might seem as the ultimate form of cognitive dissonance, this serves to be a lived reality for approximately some three thousand of the 1.25 million Palestinians within this governing area, a representative percentage of less than one percent, but still one which beggars such a sharp deviation from the norm as to naturally attract research and analysis74. To be able to acutely comprehend the phenomenon of ultra-Orthodox Jewish draft resisters, merely knowing of the existence of the inverse phenomenon on the opposite side of the Israel/Palestine dialectic should serve as sufficient reason to want to grasp and truly fathom said motivations for such an about-face on perhaps the most ingratiated communal stipulation amongst Palestinians. By rationalizing one end of the yin and yang dichotomy, and the internal contradictions and overlap contained within, only then can we get a clear-as-day likeness that can rationalize ultra-Orthodox peculiarities in the most astute way as can be perceived by an outsider.

Before any discussion of Palestinians or Palestine in relation to the Israel Defense Forces can be adequately embarked upon, it becomes requisite to contextualize the land and people of the region in a prior incarnation to the aegis for which outward and internal definitions of being ‘Palestinian’ rest upon today; namely narrowing in on the region’s status in the brief but eventful interval from the inception of Israel in 1948 to the annexation of the West Bank in 1967, when the land now comprising the West Bank was under Jordanian administration75. Servicing as a peripheral, extraterritorial extenuation of the Hashemite Kingdom following the partition of British Trans-Palestine, the West Bank was initially seen by the nascent state of Israel following its successful independence war as an ignominious dumping ground of sorts for displaced Arabs who had their homes and lands appropriated by the massive influx of Jewish settlers seeking a safe abode, a territory with which the state thought it could hopefully resettle many of the 160,000 some odd Arabs still residing within Israel’s borders proper76. Amongst these Arabs, many of whom actively participated in the military expeditions of the surrounding Arab states in hopes of obliterating this antithetical, alien republic on their own land, the solidification of the Israeli state, despite outwardly promising equal rights and representation to minority citizens, presented an existential conundrum to newly-delineated Israeli citizens who

76 Ibid. Pg. 1
were now little more than subjects to a nation-state whose core being was anathema to their proclaimed identity. While many individuals continued passive resistance to the regimen of propagandistic education that the Israeli state intuitively targeted toward national minorities, and despite the fact that Israel’s Arab community would live under essentially a military dictatorship until the lifting of the state of emergency in 1966, a handful of Arab persons living under Israeli yoke would find it prudent for their best interests to collaborate and service the state to the best of their abilities for the security of their families and erstwhile enhancement of rational self-interest. Those qualifications for participation being amongst the prime justifications in totalitarian regimes of the past for atrocities committed by individuals under its name; the ‘just following orders’ syndrome of sorts, were admittedly more difficult to rationalize by Israeli Arabs to their peers than in instances where this example has been more prurient. Said difficulties, owing to the widespread hatred for Israel amongst the community that was latent, but admittedly illegal to express publicly, these participants in state institutions would often be excused under the pretense that they were supposedly fostering Arab/Jewish equality of which the state of Israel was noticeably bereft of during this era, fomenting better perceptions of a maligned minority in the eyes of the Jewish majority through serviceability. Understandably so, this approach didn’t bode well with most Israeli Arabs who viewed the state as an imposition; rationalizing that they were ‘Arab’ as one of two main foci of existence, the other being their mainly Islamic faith, mandated a castigation of Israel and the Israeli Jew as the unapproachable ‘other’ for which the twain shall never meet. Serving as a relatively recent development, given the comparable harmony Jewish communities in Palestine pre-Zionism enjoyed, yet still one rooted in inescapable historicity, operated in tandem with an adapted lived experience for the Israeli Arab/Palestinian suited specifically for the cultural environment of the Middle East. What was lost in terms of retribution and alienation from other Arabs through collaboration was partially met with by ample distributive rewards doled out by the Israeli state of which they were in employ of, often receiving substantial sums of money and reappropriated land uprooted from prior Arab residents, who were often hired to service the state peripherally if they still lived on these plots, and these allotments would only go on to assure the small community of collaborators that their seeming betrayal was ultimately for the best. In the face of all the intra-communal institutional impediments facing collaborative Arab denizens of Israel, the incentives and self-rationalization of this about-face to their sector proved to be enough motivation for these individuals to inculcate Israeli notions of somehow being lesser persons into their inherent psyches.

78 Ibid. Pg. 21
motivating the unflinching dissemination of Israeli propaganda to other members of the Arab sector, alongside more dramatic actions, such as turning in family members suspected of crimes against the state to the security services\(^8\). Needless to say, the individuals who chose to defy community stipulations and aid the Israelis have not been delegated a favorable portrayal in the history books, even amongst accounts composed by Israeli Jews, so deliberating on their stories may lead some to wonder why certain young Palestinian Arabs have chosen not to ‘learn from past mistakes’ and resist extending a helping hand to an army and state which quite clearly contribute to their marginalization. However, as will be explicated in the following paragraphs, the catalysts for prompting Palestinian youth to essentially serve as overseers for a system predicated on an ethno-religious hierarchy whereby Arabs rank at the bottom are motivated by substantially different variables than the identitarian philosophies of the ultra-Orthodox, potentially calling into question the universality of constructivist theorems to digest any and all actions engaged upon by an individual actor in a collective.

To discuss any matter involving the ethnically Arab Palestinian people, particularly within the context of operative, performative behavior under an Israeli aegis, it becomes immediately necessary to delineate what exactly a ‘Palestinian’ is amidst a morass of conflicting Arab identities in the region of Israel/Palestine. Since attribution to a specific identity is best engaged upon by group members themselves rather than the less-informed speculation of an onlooker, it helps to analyze applied statistics gathered through a credulous process of interviewing, and to aid us in this, an (admittedly dated) population survey from 1989 given reference in Dr. Rhoda Kanaaneh’s *Surrounded: Palestinian Soldiers in the Israeli Military* provides hints as to the porousness of variable recognition amongst Arabs within the Territories and Israel proper. The survey detailed that the plurality of responders, some 43.5 percent, accepted the label of ‘Palestinian in Israel’ as their preferred terminology for defining themselves, followed by ‘Palestinian Arab’ at 25.7 percent, with only 4.1 and 2.7 percent respectively delegating themselves as simply ‘Arab’ or ‘Israeli’\(^8\). As permeable borders have shifted and overlapped in the seventy years since the inauguration of the Israeli state, so too have qualifiers for the denizens of this multifaceted land mass, making it all the more pertinent that the identifiers of ‘Israeli Arab’, referring to Arabs living within the pre-1967 borders of the Israeli state, and ‘Palestinian’, referring to the residents of the West Bank and Gaza, are not muddled together wantonly, especially in light of other ethnic Arab communities, such as the members of the Druze faith who are drafted into the IDF\(^8\). Yet, identification as an aside, our main question, narrowing in on the four thousand out of 1.25 million who do enlist, is to countenance the simple notion of ‘why’ anyone residing under restrictive military occupation in the West

\(^8\) Ibid. Pgs. 1-3
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Bank would alternatively classify allegiance with their ostensible captors rather than the broad masses regularly and readily primed for resistance to the Israeli occupation. To figure this question out proves to be more of a burden to the researcher than perhaps many other topics one could alternatively study, for being such a statistically peripheral phenomenon, a grand total of a single book has been published that accounts for this trend in any detail, but within this specific tome comes great insight into the thinking of the handful of interviewees that serve, and were willing to elucidate such, that can be applied adjacently to political science theorems for eking out answers to our quandary. Dr. Kanaaneh’s *Surrounded* is contextualized through a series of interwoven interviews initially published as a quartet of academic articles, with the common narrative meandering throughout being her profiling of 72 Palestinian Arab men and women involved in professional positions within the Israel Defense Forces and the Israel Police Service, each answering her questions in varying detail after being cajoled into accepting her trust, with many of the 72 replying in snippy, limited-word answers which the author chalks up to a sense of shame. From what she was able to garner about their prior and ongoing service, however, imparts mixed motives and mixed ‘answers’ of a sort to a seemingly inexplicable phenomenon which turns out to be dependent near-solely on the personalized rationale of each individual soldier. Starting out her examination with a case study hitting closer to home, the author profiles a man named Asel who was raised in her small Arab community of ‘Arrabi, who along with some fifteen other habitants of the village chose to join the Israeli security services in and around the approximate date of October 2000, during the apex of the Second Intifada which had recently seen some thirteen Israeli Arabs murdered by said security services, including two persons originating from ‘Arrabi. Blatantly defying the Palestinian public mood of rage towards the massacred, said fifteen souls were understandably reviled by the near-entirety of their neighbors and peers during such an emotionally contentious epoch, but, according to the research compiled by Kanaaneh, some of this sentiment may have been fanned by the Israeli establishment itself. From inception of the state onwards, including the very Arab collaborators discussed previously, there was a willingness by the authorities of Israel to metaphorically ‘throw to the wolves’ those Arabs who had aided the state back to the mercy of their unrelenting and unforgiving brethren, where Israeli Arab soldiers and policemen gained the reputation for being the most brutal of all. When disciplinary standards were violated by soldiers and officers for any reason while on duty, it would often exclusively be the Arab minority facing sanctions for misbehavior, something the

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author posits as being a warning message to potential recruits that no leniency would be given to Arabs despite their loyalty to the project of patriotism\(^{88}\). Historical precedence appears to give this claim some merit, as the Israeli state would swiftly respond to the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987 by summarily dismissing Palestinian security officials under the spurious claim that their lives would be endangered through their affiliation, even though the state’s divulgence of such was more likely to lead to said endangerment, thus reiterating in Kanaaneh’s eyes that the privileges granted to collaborators with Israel are fleeting to the minority and greatly detrimental to the majority\(^{89}\). Based on the lack of respect provided to Asel and other Arabs despite the immense, painful sacrifice it took to essentially turn one’s back on their community and enlist in the machinations of force for the state of Israel, it is implicitly insinuated that the people who do such are essentially engaged in a fool’s errand for a power seeking to cloak legitimacy in a handful of tokenistic Arab faces, with said apparatchiks essentially betraying their own heritage for the flimsy chance they will receive some material reward.

Moving on from this initial profiling, with the provocative seeds of doubt regarding Israeli intentions already cast into the reader’s mind, Kanaaneh goes forward after the case study analysis to speculate on some of the driving factors which would prompt an ambivalent young Palestinian to disperse of their communal roots, steeped in a heritage of attachment to land and the concomitant vituperation directed at the occupier, and choose to serve in the much-maligned IDF. As intimated earlier on in the introduction, the pull of material benefits, such as money, housing, and even incidentals such as cheaper movie tickets, were all recorded by the author as being stated rationales for accepting the temptation to relinquish community bonds and serve, and indeed, Israelis of all backgrounds who participate in the IDF are granted a plethora of perks in many facets of life as a societal ‘thank you’ for sacrificing three years of their lives, including financial assistance for future education and reductions in certain forms of taxation\(^{90}\). Being a society so dependent on a robust, proactive military and intelligence apparatus to ensure continued survival in such a hotly contested region, Israel attaches an unprecedented level of significance and communal gratitude to the agents of force for the state for manifesting the once-idealized pipe dream of Zionism into a lived reality, and owing to the military’s centrality in the lives of the residents of the Jewish state, the army experience is thus ascribed in the psyches of Israeli Jews as a core component of their ‘Jewishness’. Within the introductory segments of *Surrounded*, Kanaaneh succinctly summates the domineering, chauvinistic ethos underpinning ‘normalcy’ in the nation’s collective mindset as being a symbiosis of four self-replicating tropes which not only etch into stone what is demanded of self-ascribing Israelis, but also serve to reconfigure said

\(^{90}\)  Ibid. Pg. 39
groupthink against a common enemy: the Palestinian Arab. These four tropes, consisting of ‘Jewishness’, ‘masculinity’, ‘military service’, and ‘collective membership’, are engendered, particularly regarding ‘military service’, to exclude and reposition the Arabs within Israel’s midst as a loathsome diorama opposite to everything that is good and wholesome and Jewish within Israel, a universal figure of contempt and disgust for which constant preparation against its depredations must be planned and implemented, the designated Emmanuel Goldstein in the ‘Two Minute Hate’ broadcast into the consciousness of the Israeli citizen91. Thus, it can be argued from this vantage point that much of what defines and shapes an ‘Israeli’ into the thinking and acting demanded by the collective stands to not be in favor of something, or a wholly organic evolutionary process, but rather stands to serve as a process defined by near-perpetual reaction to an existential threat to survival, with Israel having initially been propositioned to the Jewish public as an impenetrable barrier preventing another Holocaust that is now being marketed as the supreme bulwark against a demographic flood of inimical Arabs.

Deviating from this philosophical bent slightly yet remaining true to the quorum of components postulated by Kanaaneh is the core tenet of ‘masculinity’, a factor which still amply takes into consideration the mandatory drafting of Jewish women, being an ineffable substructure hoisting up national consciousness and self-delineation for most Jewish citizens of Israel. To the non-Haredi Israeli Jewish male, the peak, lived experience which represents transitioning from boyhood to adulthood, excluding the symbolic rite of transference as implied in the bar mitzvah ceremony at age thirteen, is indubitably the rigor, hardship and emotional strain expended during his period of conscription in the IDF, and it is from the near-universalism of military service amongst men in Israel that a hardened, some may say embittered, worldview emerges that influences internal and external perceptions of national character. Conversely, masculinity as defined by the identitarian bloc of the Palestinian community is predicated on weighed resistance and active participation against the obstructive, militarized forces of the Israeli state, an idolized, somewhat mythic form of character embodying this role being the seemingly ubiquitous ‘David’ of the young, dispossessed Palestinian male hurling stones at the ‘Goliath’ of an Israeli military convoy. Apart from such core stipulations of male adulthood as self-sufficiency and providing for one’s family, the apotheosis of what it means to be male and Arab in the West Bank is dependent upon one’s level of engagement in the seemingly perpetual struggle to attain freedom and dignity from a heavily armed, heavy-handed captor assuring that you have neither92. For that sliver of the Palestinian male population making the conscious decision to facilitate the Israeli occupation via voluntary enlistment, how they define themselves as ‘men’ is instead predicated upon the conditionalities that Israeli Jewish men who lack the zealous Zionism of some of their peers rationalize the benefits of IDF induction, seeing the need to take care of one’s self

92  Ibid. Pg. 80
and family as being aided by a steady paycheck and the metaphorical ‘paving the way’ into the professional sphere by having passed the military milestone. When put to the ‘stress test’ of Kanaaneh’s aggressive line of questioning in one-on-one interviews with Palestinian participants, many of the young men would attempt to rationalize this seemingly treasonous behavior to a fellow Arab by explicating how the lack of other viable career opportunities in the economically marginalized West Bank reduces one to have to resort to ‘grunt’ work for the apparatuses of the hated Israelis in order to put food on the table, claims which are deemed understandable, yet not acceptable, in the author’s eyes given the immense struggle fellow Palestinians are engaged in to break free from the yoke of occupation.

Wherever any individual Palestinian runs in the gamut of justification for rationalizing the seemingly shocking decision to put aside one’s mandate to resist and instead join the institution others rebel against, they will inevitably face omnipresent and existential problems regarding acculturation as Arabs into the military force of the world’s only Jewish state, whereby programmatic inoculation of the Arab as implacable foe serves as an intransigent code in the commencement of any and all operations. Blatant, strained attempts at doing such by some Palestinian recruits aside, examples of which chronicled by Kanaaneh include adoption of Hebraized nomenclature and conversion to Judaism, the Sisyphean burden of normalizing one’s presence as an Arab of any caliber to a band of agency-deprived men and women assimilated into a spirit of reaction towards the Arab as enemy remains an unrequited labor of love for those Palestinians willing to expend such. The often-explicitly stated notion that an Arab can never ascend to the legitimacy and valor of a Jewish soldier in the realm of combat within the nation-state specifically codified for the Jewish people inevitably weighs down even the most committed Arab recruit, as gripes over the identitarian, Jewish nature of the IDF are rationalized as being the primary factor behind the failure of Arab soldiers to receive adequate commendation and recognition for their services. Even when tributes are provided to the Arab in fealty to the state, said tributes are most often done posthumously, in specially curated graveyards and memorials which fetishize the sacrificed as being one of a handful of ‘good Arabs’ who were willing to sublimate their inherent ‘Arabness’ for the good of the Jewish cause. Through these tandem implicit and explicit slights against the dignity of the Arab soldier, Kanaaneh concludes her book writ large with a critique of the posturing of a fellow political scientist and theorist, albeit one who happens to be an Israeli Jewish Zionist, on the purported positivity of ‘Israelization’ on the Arab inductee into the military in terms of acculturation to the mainline ideological paradigm of Israeli Jewry. Rebuking,

94 Ibid. Pg. 87
95 Ibid. Pgs. 99, 136
96 Ibid. Pg. 109
97 Ibid. Pg. 102
albeit in the professional manner delineating the text, the theorem of Sami Smooha that assimilation, coerced or otherwise, can only have a net positive on facilitating a more pacific, cooperative environment within Israel, the author excoriates the seeming necessitude of the indigenous minority on the land to acculturate to the whims and norms of a caste of colonizers, more specifically the Ashkenazi-normative standards imparted by the domineering Israeli establishment, and ultimately parleys Arab participants in the IDF as complicit in this insidious de-Arabization narrative by wont of their ‘selling out’98.

Supposing that the postulations of Dr. Kanaaneh are valid, that within the push by several segments of the Israeli establishment to inculcate certain volunteering Arabs into the Israel Defense Forces, and by proxy following completion of service mainline Israeli society, is an insidious, perhaps assiduous, ploy to effectively ‘de-Arabize’ said individuals, whisking away the cornerstones of their constitutive identity to deracinate these persons and make them less of a ‘threat’ to Israeli Jews, then we as observers need to be clear in defining what a contrarian, authentically ‘Palestinian’ identity constitutes. As alluded to earlier within this text, the emergence of a consciousness of being ‘Palestinian’, as a distinct sub-set of the Arab people resident in the formerly British territory designated as a separate bloc from that of Transjordan, has seemingly been a relatively recent development in the annals of Middle Eastern history, and one which has been principally been reactive to outside forces for its evolutionary process rather than being organically emergent. When ‘Palestinians’ first emerged on the metaphorical radar screen of international consciousness in the latter years of the nineteenth century, it was to be in the context of several well-publicized revolts by disenfranchised peasants in what was then Ottoman land against the permissive policies of certain landed sheiks towards deeding and selling allotments of land to Jewish settlers from the Zionist movement, said lands having been appropriated from their original owners with nary any compensation. In tandem to this trend of mass uprooting of the proletariat, ethnically Arab intellectuals residing within the urban areas of what was then a nondescript territorial backwater would begin to heed the clarion call of their less fortunate brethren, and publicize the plight of the indigenous itinerant farmers through both written prose and direct action in the streets, calcifying a new, ethnological nexus by which local residents could pinpoint a sense of belonging, the newly-derived appendage of ‘Palestinian’ self-identification99. Newly molded solely on the basis of territorial residence and affinity, and not beholden to either of the two main creeds of Christianity and Islam predominant amongst local Arabs, this new nationalism, as emulative of the liberalist and romanticist European models of the era as it was, was ultimately begotten out of force and imposition from outsiders rather than as a sudden effusive outpouring of self-consciousness, and its development over time would be predicated on further impositions from myriad parties. Simultaneous

to the emanation of a Palestinian nationalism, concurrent nationalistic movements in other regions of the multi-faceted Arab world would emerge and largely ally with one another out of a common, mutualistic self-interest against colonialist settlement on their native lands, with these synergistic manifestations of populist will eventually collating together under the ideological handle of pan-Arabism. Over time, pan-Arabism would secure itself to the mantle of Palestinian self-determination, and appropriate what was formerly deemed a regionalist, irredentist struggle for parochial autonomy and self-determination into a constituent piece of the larger puzzle of banishing all foreign administration whereby Arabs resided, merging all Arab-inhabited territories under a single national banner. Using the legitimate struggles of the Palestinian population as a sort of trump card against inimical forces such as Zionism denying a fragment of the ‘one-nation’ dream from coming to fruition, pan-Arabists past and present would often appeal to the yearning of Palestine for independence with soothing rhetoric and occasional material aid, yet would still envision Palestine as being subjugated to a centralized, pan-Arab authority ultimately governed from another corner of the region. Said double-edged sword, brought most pointedly to the forefront by Syrian Ba’athist stipulations that a Palestine liberated at their hand during either of the nation’s three conflagrations with Israel would need hegemonic administration from Damascus for legitimacy, is proof-positive of the use and abuse of the Palestinian struggle to meet the capricious ends of power-players in the region for their own enrichment. Thus, Palestinian nationalism, whether from outward foe (Zionism), or self-motivated ‘friend’ (Pan-Arabism), has often gotten a raw deal in the transference of borders and populations that have been ongoing throughout the Levant since the initial waves of Jewish settlement. Between facing these forces and other contradictory ideologies prevalent in the Middle East, such as the Islamist notion that nationalism is antithetical to the idealized merging of the Islamic world under one global ummah, said constant pillorying and subjugation from much more well-heeled powers can be understood as largely accounting for the at-present plight and lack of recognition the Palestinian nation suffers from at-present. Given this denial of an exclusive, resourced national consciousness free from either parasitical appendage by opportunists or outright occupation of land, and given the dearth of opportunity that is to be found for self-advancement in the economically deprived West Bank, perhaps it is not a small wonder to behold the fact that some separate persons might find appeal in the comparatively prosperous model of the Israelis and choose to alternate their allegiance in their direction for the hopes of making a name for oneself defending their realm?

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101 Ibid. Pg. 148
102 Ibid. Pgs. 145-6
Throughout this paper, ample time and effort has been devoted into formulating a nuanced, complicated historiography on two seemingly antithetical, yet coincidentally similar ethno/cultural/religious groups residing within the fractious region of Israel/Palestine. This analysis has been gone about via the sourcing of information from mostly contemporaneous narratives and theoretical diatribes which have padded fundamental fact with introspective thought on the ontological rationale for why members of these groupings act and react in the way in which they do. However, as is necessary for any treatise paper worth its weight, there is the necessitude of including raw data and figures for the purposes of reinforcing all hypotheses that have been asserted by the author, for without rigor and application of the scientific method, what are essentially guesses can only be mustered up to the nagging questions which perplex in the annals of social science. Therefore, in this portion of the paper, there is the obligation to delve into matters quantitative as well as qualitative, to look directly at raw statistical compilations of data derived from source interviews with the constituent members of these communities themselves, and extrapolate any parcels of information which can be retrieved therein to gleam answers on the puzzling, contradictory attitudes of ultra-Orthodox draft refusers and Palestinian army enlistees. Then, and only then, is it possible to satisfactorily say that this enigma of a phenomenon has been given due diligence, and only coupled with a narration of historicity and the scope of a logical investigation utilizing applied theorems can any opinion or logical conclusion be stated that can make this initial mystery seem less opaque.

To begin this foray into the realm of applied statistics, it is requisite to ponder over a visualization of a previously mentioned survey, one that is admittedly aged (29 years old), but one which still holds water in the delineation of self-identification of national and cultural particularities for ethnic Arabs residing within the Jewish nation-state of Israel proper, one that gleans deep insight into the performative character of a consigned minority group merely by asking the question of ‘what are you?’:
Regarding the above pie chart, even the faintest glance at its contents brings to light several immediate, un-mistakeable trends which impart certain notions of self-identification, border permeation and rigidity, and the successes and failures of several identitarian blocs within Israel/Palestine to attract devotees to their specific assignation of being upon a region whereby many definitions of self are relatively contemporary. To begin with, we instantly notice that the plurality of respondents, nearing half of the total (43.5%), label themselves unreservedly as 'Palestinian in Israel,' a descriptor which suggests inherent ‘foreignness’ and the sense of being a stranger in a strange land despite the indigeneity of the ethnic Arab to historically Palestinian territory. Following upon this overwhelming unity in categorization, another sizeable chunk of those surveyed, some 25.7% of respondents, classified themselves as simply ‘Palestinian Arab’, a notion of self which does impart indigeneity, alongside uniqueness from a regionalist-oriented conglomeration of ethnic Arabs that the mere moniker of ‘Arab’, with 4.1% of respondents responding in kind, would instead allude to. Diametric labels predicated upon a neat, evenly-divided nationalist dichotomy of being either ‘Israeli’ (2.7%) or ‘Palestinian’ (4.5%) do not seem to have much traction amongst those surveyed, which can be said to represent a negative attitude to self-affiliating with the nationality of the Jews and of the occupier of land alongside a lack of institutionalization of the ‘Palestinian' label at this point in time. Summating the graph, the top five responses for categorization all include the moniker of ‘Palestinian’ in one way or another, and little to no affiliation with the nation-state of Israel for which these students are currently based out of, thus bringing to the forefront several telling assurances. Imparted as a self-evident norm by the clear majority of participants, and in line with the trends leading to the evolution of the
Palestinian sense of nationhood from its inception, the ‘Palestinian’ designation of these students suggests an oppositional ballast against the imprimatur of ‘Israeliness’ granted to resident Jews, a rejection to the legitimacy of the descendants of Zionist pioneers and other Jewish immigrants to hold and claim the land as their own, and an assertion of unassailable nationhood and belonging despite historical denials by Israel of the right of Palestinians to legitimize themselves. The norm of being ‘Palestinian’ as an identifier amongst individuals who may very well come from within Arab and mixed-demographic communities within pre-1967 borders Israel serves as both a symbolic defiance of the reality of Israel’s concrete, structured existence overlapping Arab land claims, and a reactive designation to the overwhelming cultural ‘Israeli-ness’ surrounding these students in all facets of life during their studies, similar to how certain Israeli Jews define their identity as being contrarian to the Arabs sharing space with them. By asserting themselves as Palestinians, rather than adopting the Jewish-oriented baggage that comes with the ‘Israeli’ handle, or buying into the pan-Arab mentality by seeing themselves as merely ‘Arab’, these youths are asserting a uniqueness for which most other power players would prefer to not see exist, and explicating a subtle defiance of the Israeli state and its demographic constitution during the period of the First Intifada.

Moving onward to the primary aegis for the paper, that of the character and mentality of Israel’s ultra-Orthodox Jewish community, demography yet again plays a striking role in how the issue presses upon the national consciousness of Israelis in a way which was not as omnipresent in prior decades, owing solely to massive Haredi population growth. To quantify its effect on the present and implications for the future, here follows two graphs which set the stage for various estimates of long-term trends in inexorable increases in the number and influence of the Haredi sector, which will make themselves known in later years as a problem that will force out a political solution to the deferment controversy by hook or by crook:

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Looking at these charts, it becomes abundantly clear from even the most conservative estimate that the Haredim will be able to punch well above their current
weight in the following decades on sole account of their rapidly expanding numbers in terms of proportion and sheer aggregate, a level of increase that can be attributed solely to substantially large family sizes, averaging 7.4 children per household. From that pull upon Israel’s body politic, the Haredim will not only have greater leverage in the halls of government via emboldened political parties commanding a larger swing of the vote, but the presently underlying fears over a possible dearth in army recruitment figures considering the current exemption of the Haredi sector will be realized, as scores more people will remain outside the net of conscription for which the small state of Israel, surrounded by enemies as it is, needs to ensure fundamental survival. As well, a character change in what comprises inherent ‘Israeli-ness’ will beget a most unwelcome transition for those who view liberal, secular democracy and Zionist principles as being the cornerstones of the national ethos, as a non-Zionist, radically traditionalist grouping which wishes to see religion subsume the workings of government and the mainstays of society will be in a better position to see this accomplished, fundamentally altering constituent identity for good. Referring to the graphs themselves, the median projections insinuate that Haredim will comprise some 4 million individuals by the year 2059 in contrast to a total of 8 million non-Haredi Jews which will be resident within Israel at that time, doubling their total population share from a sixth to a third of Jewish residents of Israel, a demographic shift which does not account for increases in the Arab sector as well.

For someone with the ideological bent of Yair Lapid and the Yesh Atid party, desiring secularity and liberalism as the edifices for a state construct which remains firmly Jewish and Zionist, this double-edged demographic sword represents a nightmarish future in a somewhat ironic riposte to the party’s handle. With this specter of unwelcome change emergent almost as a given due to imbalanced fertility rates, the emergence of a contrarian political front whose primary focus seems to be to stave off Haredi cultural encroachments and to end the societal imbalances brought upon by the draft exemption was a likely event for this current era, tapping into formerly murmured discontent about feared displacement and demographic change in a manner not unlike right-wing populist forces in contemporary Europe. Tailoring this message in the convenient cloak of national security, an all-present bugaboo given Israel’s security situation that also draws parallels to anti-immigration pontification regarding terrorism in the West, the notion, admittedly given some credence from the statistics, that the nation’s vital security interests are endangered by growing numbers exempted from mandatory conscription, can catalyze an almost primal urgency in the voting public to pursue radical, broad-sweeping reaction. Deigning to address an application of theory, constructivism’s understandings of identity as a reactive, permeable construct can, at face value, be used to rationalize the brute reactionary impulse of someone like the late Tommy Lapid banging his fist down on a table and proclaiming the likes of himself, and not the ultra-Orthodox, to be the true heirs.

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of the prophets of old. Constructivists would argue that said reaction is motivated by a primal ‘fight’ response to any encroachment upon the delineated, temporal space they perceive to be their community, in this case serving to be the nation of Israel and its supposed secularist, liberal character, with the ultra-Orthodox serving as the consigned ‘foil’ in Lapid’s mindset as opposed to Arabs or another rivaling community. Either way, the numbers are what they are, the Haredim are set to enjoy soaring growth rates that will consolidate and strengthen the collective’s political power and social clout, and the remainder of the state of Israel remains flummoxed as to the correct way to inculcate this recalcitrant demographic into the military’s fold before not doing so becomes a potentially lethal burden to the nation’s future.

One sub-topic to the Haredi draft issue is to discuss the small but growing handful of Haredim who, like their Palestinian enrollee counterparts, do decide to enlist for three-year terms in the Israel Defense Forces and serve the country which the remainder of their demographic has ambivalent feelings towards. Converging upon this contradiction to the norm are alternate numbers of Haredim who take what may perhaps be deemed as a ‘compromise’ position to the bifurcated debate of either military service or no service, opting for the ‘third way’ offered by the Israeli state to participate in some form of civil service or volunteer work for a given allotment of time in place of military duties. The two graphs following display the actualization of this phenomenon in recent years with real, quantified numbers and figures in an attempt to explicate to the reader, and possibly the worried, secular Israeli, that there are indeed Haredim which have the impulse to accept service to the state as not being wholly antithetical to their sense of being, and the information therein could possibly provide suggestions on how to remediate this problem later on:
In 2007, the baseline comparison for all following years accounted for in Figure 4, some 290 Haredi men were recorded as being involved in military service in one form or another, while absolutely no Haredim were accounted for engaging in other acts of
volunteerism. Some six years later, as indicated in Figure 5, a respectable 39 percent of total volunteers in the civil service sector are indicated as being Haredim, in contrast to only 23 percent being from non-Haredi Jewish communities, presenting a seemingly baffling contradiction when initially confronted with the numbers as to how this discrepancy can possibly be feasible. A partial explanation to this mystery may lie in the textual descriptor accompanying this graph in the Statistical Report on Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel 2016, which explains that despite an only 5% total share of the Haredi population engaging in an alternative form of civil service other than the military, the proportional rate, owing to an accommodational path for national service engendered by the government to take advantage of Haredi labor, is treble that of the general population, and the numbers for Haredim continue to rise, but not at the rate of other Israelis\textsuperscript{105}. Within the military proper, the locale serving as a sort of golden goose for Israeli secularists as to where the ultra-Orthodox belong, volunteerism, defying any and ever community norm in a manner not unlike the Palestinian recruits, is also indicated as being on the uptick, as some thirty percent of eligible young Haredi men in 2016 were recorded as being participatory in the service, a rise from previous figures, yet still shy of the 33,000 idealized by politicos as a benchmark for minimal enlistment. The younger generation, those 20-something Haredim who are either at the cusp, or past the mark, of the average age for service, are also registered as having a much higher rate of volunteerism than Haredim of prior generations, indicating that the current increases in registration numbers are an abrupt, rather immediate phenomenon that was likely predicated by some contemporary impetus, perhaps a more successful propagandistic campaign by the state than most\textsuperscript{106}. Excusing declines in national service enrollment in 2012 and 2014, every data point in Figure 4 indicates gradual increases in participation in state-backed ventures, a sort of encroaching defiance upon the throngs of black-hatted protestors periodically lining the streets of Jerusalem in abject rage, alongside negating the precept held amongst militant secularists that the Haredim consist solely of a demographic lazing about on the taxpayer’s dime whilst contributing nothing in return to better the Israeli collective writ large. This does not, however, negate the fact that the broad majority of Haredim have not, and will not, voluntarily serve the I.D.F. in contrast to three years which could be spent studying at the yeshiva, or that the anti-Zionist radicals don’t represent at least a substantial subset of the Haredi community, or even that the community ‘bloc’ of sorts representing the Haredim would be willing to acquiesce to a military draft without putting up a fight. What it does indicate, though, is that things are not nearly as dichotomously black or white as plaudits and rabble-rousers on either side of the debate would suggest them to be, that perhaps there is indeed some room for middle ground between parties as pioneered by aspiring young individuals and understanding political and military officials, who are capable of forgoing rigidity and extremism to


\textsuperscript{106} Ibid. Pg. 24
contribute to fair and equitable solutions for making the state a better place. Granted, the ideologues have a louder voice and a taller soapbox on which to stand, but the statistics displayed above somewhat negate the doom-and-gloom scenarios of secularist Israeli pessimists and ameliorate the sense that an impending crisis upon enlistment numbers in nigh.

In conclusion, the graph below, derived from information compiled by the Pew Research Center, hopefully transcends the blowhard caterwauling of opportunistic politicos and Haredi community spokesmen to answer the fundamental question of figuring out what the general Israeli public, across all demographic stripes, feels regarding the at-present status of Haredi exemptions from military service. Delivering some expected results and potential surprises as well, the data is meticulously delineated along every imaginable category of self-classification, and unwittingly imparts several parcels of information to those coming at this issue from an identitarian, sociologically constructivist perspective that may be of use towards cracking the code of the impetuses behind each side’s obstinacy in the broader debate:


Upon looking at the graph initially, certain assumptions appear to have been confirmed. For starters, a clear majority of Israeli Jews, some 72 percent, advocate for a changing of the law which exempts the Haredim from service while the clear majority of Haredim, some 83 percent, forthrightly reject said proposition. Hilonim, or secular, Jews support drafting the Haredim with even broader margins than the Haredim oppose drafting themselves, as approximately 90 percent of secular Jews endorse this notion in contrast to 70 percent of Masortim (conservative, traditionalist Jews) and 54 percent of Datim (non-Haredi Orthodox Jews). Women are more likely to support conscription than men, possibly because of resentment to ingrained patriarchal structures in ultra-Orthodox
communities, as well as the fact that ultra-Orthodox respondents are likely to be exclusively men, and the better educated support conscription more emphatically than the less educated, a category which college-avoiding yeshiva students are likely to find themselves in. In terms of age, surprisingly enough, more young people are likely to back the status quo than their elders, but when one weights the overall youth of the Haredi sector in tandem with their rapid growth rates, surprise in this instance begins to level. Linguistically, a whopping, yet expected, 90 percent of Yiddish speakers, reject conscription for the ultra-Orthodox, with Yiddish being the near-exclusive parlance of Haredi Jews today. Meanwhile, Russian speakers hailing from near-atheistic Jewish communities from the former USSR are more likely to favor mandatory conscription over their Hebrew-speaking brethren, with 77 percent of Russian speakers responding affirmatively in contrast to a close 73 percent for those speaking the national tongue. Ethnically, despite the clear majority of Haredim being of Ashkenazi descent, Ashkenazim, known for their relative political liberalism within the Israeli electorate, are more likely, at a rate of 76 to 69 percent, to support conscription over more politically conservative ethnic Sephardim/Mizrahim. Looking at the data, it appears that there exists an overwhelming mandate within Israel to upend current legislation, such as the excusatory Tal Law of 2002 buttressed by the Supreme Court, and pursue the path desired by many of Israel’s political parties and representatives to ensure that all citizens of the state are equally mandated with as many responsibilities as rights in the civic sphere. Nonetheless, the blaring din of the Haredi lobby, whether through elected political representatives or direct action in the streets, remains very loud, and a unilateral move to pursue mandatory conscription would be likely to result in wide-spread civil unrest in Haredi neighborhoods such as Mea Shearim in Jerusalem or the city of Bnei Brak, something the military and police would dread owing to the obstinacy and sheer determination that many of these protestors would possess against their will. As well, the political clout that Haredi parties such as United Torah Judaism and Shas have as kingmakers for coalition governments, particularly now with the temporary alliance formed between UTJ, Shas, and the governing Likud, occludes any realistic possibility that legislation will be passed by a still-popular government angling for that minority affiliation currently. Only a further evolution in attitudes from both the Haredi and Hiloni sectors, and any sort of change in a leading political party in the Knesset which opposes the status quo, such as popular runner-up Yesh Atid, could possibly affect change regarding this unpopular legislation, but as for now Israel’s government and society remain in a stalemate that will likely to remain as such barring unforeseen circumstances, hence enhancing the relevancy of why potential solutions need to be examined and debated.

Odd Men Out-Haredi IDF Volunteers-

As predicated thus far, this paper has largely construed the contentious debate over Haredi IDF draft exclusion as being a zero-sum game of either-or, with the Haredim being portrayed as a singular bloc which is uniform on its steadfastness to never serve. Said perception continues from a historical pattern of never having served, which contrasts to the broader Israeli public being uniformly rendered as an aggrieved constituency which has tried, yet failed, to rope the recalcitrant Haredim into the military’s rank and file. However, as reality would have it, there exist little to no absolutes within the prisms of human sociology or geopolitics, and with every stereotyped standard for which one’s limited perceptions of the world around them necessitate, there is at least one, usually multiple, example(s) which defy neatly-packaged, associational impressions, challenging the presented to think deeper about the subject in question, in a similar manner to the surprise many react with when confronted with the actuality of non-Zionist Jews. Such as it is with garish exceptions to the rule in that facet, recalling the Haredim of the Neturei Karta brandishing ‘Free Palestine’ banners at protest rallies, so it is with the general norm of Haredi avoidance of military service. Within the context of Israel’s recent history are multiple examples of young Haredi men who buck communitarian stigma to participate in the grand national project of providing protection to the nation-state, most often being corralled into specialized units, said units understandably adapting the experience to cater to the needs of a societally isolated community. The two-primary institutionalized sub-units providing an ‘army experience’ modified to Haredi tastes within Israel today would be the ‘Hesder’ battalion, primarily engendered for Zionist, National Religious Jews resident in the West Bank settlements, whereby a five-year term of service is punctuated with only one and a half years of combat training in contrast to three and a half years of yeshiva study. Concomitant to this branch is the ‘Nahal Haredi’ unit, specifically catering to the ultra-Orthodox demographic proper and the one branch of the military directly relevant to the topic of this paper, considering its specialization and accommodation for Haredim wary of both the I.D.F. and its underpinning Zionist ideals.

Gaining its enumeration as a corps of soldiers only as recently as 2002, in line with its profiling in the then-contemporary work of Noah Efron’s *Real Jews*, the Nahal Haredi unit became institutionalized as the result of deal-making between Israeli politicos and moderate Haredi spokesmen under the auspices that the strictest of standards in terms of kosher food, ample time set aside for prayers, and an exclusionary attitude toward female recruits would be abided by. Primarily appealing to, and given the go-ahead to operate by, the staunchly Zionist, yet Haredi, Chabad-Lubavitch movement headquartered in New York, many diasporic Jews committed to both Israel’s security and strict religiosity, from locales such as the United States and France, would make Aliyah (emigrate), some

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temporarily, to Israel for the specific rationale of joining the battalion\textsuperscript{109}. Thanks to the staffing of the Nahal Haredi unit with these primarily foreign recruits, initial statistics provided by the IDF’s own census bureau, at the very least the ones permitted to be released for public consumption, reflected generously on the supposed success of this somewhat AstroTurf, makeshift construct, meant to give legitimation to (largely failed) Israeli government efforts toward integration. Within the first five years of its existence, the Nahal Haredi unit would enjoy steadily exponential rises in enlistment numbers, and when coupled with the civilian-oriented Shahar program inaugurated in the latter months of 2007, engineered to train Haredi males in technical skills to aid entry into the workforce, further successes would be apparent, with a fifty percent rise in enlees in the year 2010 being punctuated by a further twenty percent increase the following year\textsuperscript{110}. Having faint parallels to exploratory brigades established in the mid-to-late 1950’s, which consisted of rag-tag bands of academically uninspired young Haredim semi-coerced into experimental enlistment to test the waters of what could be passively accomplished with this sector, the Nahal Haredi unit was nevertheless unprecedented in terms of the degree of its institutionalization and recognition amongst the broader Israeli public that a seemingly easy solution to the provocative Haredi draft issue could be brought about\textsuperscript{111}. Not surprisingly, some of the more libertine, laical elements within Israeli society, particularly amongst those on the political left and ideological feminists, took umbrage at the denial of representation of women within the Nahal Haredi brigade, a seeming violation of the state’s duty toward implementing legalistic non-discrimination ordinances in all facets of governance under its helm. Doubling down on this dereliction of duty to ensure equality between the sexes, other aspects of the Haredi draft exclusion which had been in operation since the near-inception of the state, such as the deferment plan for religious, (Haredi or Dati) women commanding evidence of piety in order to ensure enlistment, alongside the limit of two year-long service established for women in general as opposed to the mandate of three years for men, have been equally nitpicked and raised as qualms by these individuals as a sexist defiance of civil society\textsuperscript{112}. Several high-profile, rather extreme, instances of culture clash between secularist and Haredi recruits once inculcated under the auspices of the I.D.F., such as the insistence by commanders of the Nahal Haredi that enlistees not be exposed to women in the army choir singing, lest it lead them to think ‘impure thoughts’, have been publicized in Israeli media in recent


\textsuperscript{110} Ibid. Pgs. 121-2


years, particularly in left-leaning publications such as Haaretz, as evidence that more work has yet to be done on assimilatory measures directed towards the ultra-Orthodox sector113.

Culture shock, which serves as a discomfiting experiential state that can easily be affixed as a label to describe the animosity between Haredim and Hilonim, is ultimately the base emotion underscoring the actualization of grievances on either side of this dichotomy. The vast gulfs in lived reality and perceptual scope amongst the secular and religious, particularly regarding the latter’s incapability to process the significance of military service amongst broader Israeli society, can ultimately be chalked up to miscommunication and inarticulation. When non-Haredi Israeli Jews hold to their hearts the value of military service, as something to be endured and relished as a mandated prerequisite to authentic citizenship and recognition as an arbiter of self-value, the inculcation into a militaristic state of mind from both direct training in active duty and residual influence from similarly reared family and societal members naturally begets suspicion to outside influences deemed hostile to the esprit de corps. Non-participants in the national project of the I.D.F., namely Haredim and Arabs, already peripheral demographics made doubly so by their exclusion from the militaristic rite of passage, are thus deemed as not having a legitimate stake in the benefits which can be reaped by being bestowed the title of an ‘Israeli citizen’, in other words serving to be mere stragglers on the welfare rolls that were already suspect in the eyes of the mainline Israeli Jew on account of their ‘otherness’114. Since mandated participation in the armed services amongst the broad majority of Israel’s citizens ascribes responsibility for the state’s upkeep in a manner almost unprecedented in the contemporary global body politic, militarism in the mentality of soldier and civilian, which eventually trickles upward to the highest-ranked policy makers and opinion shapers in politics and media, eventually becomes a key paragon of what citizenship in the state of Israel actually means. Said hardening of the individual and collective psyches, analogized by the descriptor of Israelis as being like an indigenous Sabra cactus; in other words, ‘tough on the outside, soft on the inside’, creates insularity and suspicion of those outside the possible reach of these ideals; namely Arabs and Haredim immune from conscription, and there is a broad-reaching perception amongst mainline Israelis that these groups are not worthy of citizenship, perhaps not even being deserving of residence within their mythologized conception of the ‘Land of Israel’115. The boundaries for what constitutes authentic ‘civic responsibility’ within Israel since its inception lie solely within what the Israel Defense Forces can muster and give in provenance to its membership, as much of the early development in the nation succeeding the successes of the 1948 Independence War was conducted by volunteer projects under

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115 Ibid. Pg. 87
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I.D.F. auspices, as desired and delineated by Ben-Gurion himself, who envisioned an eventual 'melting pot' environment for Jews originating from all over the world, sans the already excluded Haredim, that would selflessly sacrifice time and energy out of genuine patriotism and love for the collective116. Under this equation for purported national success, two key constituencies resident within the boundaries of the pre-expansionist state, the aforementioned Haredi and Arab demographics, had already been cast aside as essentially burdensome weights upon the fledgling nation that could never, and should never, be assimilated from any attempt by state agencies, no matter how altruistic said attempts were, and it was to be reasoned that whatever potential these groups could possibly bring to the table was not worth the effort of their acculturation.

Internalizing said castigation both out of adaptation to the limitations placed in front of them, coupled with the genuine desire of the community to remain isolated from the dominance of Israeli society and its antithetical value system, the Haredim, to be viewed in this instance as a singular unit with a hive mind, swore amongst themselves to keep on living in the brave new world of modern Israel as if they had been unilaterally dropped off in the Holy Land from the shtetls of Europe, betokening what was to be later dubbed 'the diaspora mentality'117. Understanding both the intra-community stipulations against aiding the state, along with the browbeating ensuring that the Haredim never felt at home within Israel’s communitarian ethos, the ultra-Orthodox demographic would come to not only distance themselves from, but actively begin to revile, the Israel Defense Forces as oppressor. Manifest by the unleashing of bully clubs by soldiers, police, and border guards upon unruly Haredi demonstrators during the periodic protests against the possibility of conscription, the Israeli officer is thus viewed as the ultimate, loathsome embodiment of 'the man', and as such, any Haredi individual deemed as being directly, or even peripherally, involved in facilitating the aims of the state is automatically deemed to be the utmost of villains. One need look no further than the pashkevilim (communicatory posters) brandished about on the walls of Haredi communities, serving to many as the only source of news in an environment where most other forms of media are banned, and how said posters portray I.D.F. soldiers, particularly the limited numbers of Haredim participant, to get a palpable feel of the rank animosity defining the I.D.F./Haredi relationship. Certain leaflets, excoriating the military and the state as a whole as being a ‘Zionist Amalek,’ (Amalek being a Biblical adversary of the Israelites) scrounging up ‘spiritually desecrated’ Haredi men, and spitting them out once used and abused, are coupled with caricatures of I.D.F. troops as pigs, the ultimate in treif (non-kosher) livestock, to bring home the point that the Israeli state remains the most insidious

temporal adversary. Nevertheless, despite said myriad invective bleated by community radicals such as the infamous ‘Jerusalem Faction’ of militantly anti-Zionist Haredim, it can be argued that the clear majority of ultra-Orthodox Jews are not as truculent towards the agents of the state as certain rabble-rousers within their religious aegis are, yet, because of the communicational and cultural barriers that wall off the Haredim from mainstream Israeli society, any contrarian messaging that could potentially counteract this narrative thus becomes lost in translation. The Haredim have a proud legacy, a proud lived cultural reality steeped in years of tradition fomented from hardship and persecution, and the Haredim remain dead-set in their intention to foresee a future for their culture and livelihood, understanding that the secular world, especially the world of secular Jewry, is but a sequence of fleeting phases which contrasts to the permanence of the absolute truth embodied in the scriptures. Perceived backwardness of the Haredim from the rest of Israeli society, who have been secularized and acculturated, exceedingly so in the modern era, to a philosophically liberalist paradigm of Western, mainly American, origin, often begets the need by more secular Israelis to want to ‘enlighten’ and ‘liberate’ the Haredim from the shackles of ancient tradition and unrelenting religious stipulation, often not realizing that said impetuousness can actually impinge upon, rather than aid, the possibility of their conscription. Rather, there exists the possibility that a different tact is requisite to cajole reluctant Haredim into fulfilling what the majority agree to be their shared civic duty, one which provides accommodation to their unique needs as a largely isolated community, yet still demands that every eligible Haredi male does his duty for the nation’s upkeep, and it is seemingly from this exclusive paradigm of operation that any progress can be made on infusing this neglected sector into the broader public sphere.

Future Implications & Potential Solutions-

As alluded to earlier on in this tome when discussing the tacit motivations commandeering certain Palestinians in the Territories to enlist in the IDF, appeals to one’s group ethos and cultural stipulations, whilst a domineering mainstay in the psyches of the world’s peoples, sometimes falter in the wake of more temporal, materialistic incentives placed in front of one’s gaze. With the cases of certain young ultra-Orthodox men, the community does not prove itself to be an exception to the rule. Accounting for the broader hold that ritualistic norms and adherence to tradition have on this more insular subset of Jewish and Israeli body politics, there nevertheless are, and have been, young

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120 Ibid. Pg. 1
121 Ibid. Pg. 5
Haredi males who jettison their own internalized taboos and volunteer to enlist in the I.D.F., despite the invective and hatred said enrollment attracts from radicalized community members, and in instances whereby said motivations are revealed, the exegesis of said decision often comes down to pressing concerns regarding finances. Burdened by endemic poverty rates and coupled with the unique stressors imposed on Haredi life via community practices, such as exceedingly large family sizes, daily life for many within the ultra-Orthodox sector often amounts to a struggle for survival for which state stipends cannot suffice, begetting the liberalization of attitudes toward employment as embodied by revisionist edicts from community leaders. Since many career pathways within Israel either have the underlying expectation of, or provide incentivized favors towards, the completion of a full stint of military service, the dire straits many aspiring young Haredim find themselves in within the unrelenting rat race of a globalized market economy have had the potentiality to shift the mindsets of formerly recalcitrant young males towards accepting time in the corps as a means of simply ensuring where their next meal is coming from\textsuperscript{122}. Said exigency is often joined together with cajolment by comparatively sympathetic army recruiters, who have recently cobbled together a pathway to service including a six-month introductory training course in disciplines such as computer programming and engineering. This enticing opportunity, succeeded by easement into non-combat, intelligence-related sectors of the military after completion, provides a feasible alternative for Haredim over the age of twenty, sweetening the pot of participation for a skeptical demographic while offering the opportunity of a promising career afterwards within rapidly in-demand sectors\textsuperscript{123}. Despite remonstrations from reactionary rabbis who demand that their followers eschew all engagement with modern information technology, it remains well within the consciousness of young Haredim that the present and future are predicated by the Internet and other mainstays of modern computing. Indeed, a conspicuous lack of enforcement on these matters by rabbinical courts as of recent, along with the passivity and tacit recognition of the value of the armed forces by high-ranking Haredi rabbis who would usually be expected to issue protest, perhaps signals a gradualist paradigm shift amongst members of the sector that broader engagement with more secular Jews engaged in temporal pursuits is not the spiritual death sentence some particularly lurid devotees have imagined it to be\textsuperscript{124}.

While providing asides for economic matters in the case-by-case instances above whereby attempts to deign to the fundamentals of identity formation fail to hold muster, it would be neglectful to forsake the case studies of certain young Haredim who are motivated by an alternate, but no less valuable, pull of belonging and acceptance to that

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid. Pg. 3
which their endogenous societal structures provide in abundance; namely the explicit desire to assimilate (to whatever degree permissible) into the broader context of mainstream Israeli society and show their worth to a collective which remains deeply skeptical of their potential. Often hectored into internalizing an inferiority complex by mainline politicos, media professionals, and the average man/woman on the street buying into societal constructs, certain young Haredim who may very well want to become more ‘Israeli’ in the specific sense of the term are dissuaded by repetition of the tired mantra that any further accommodation to the meticulous religious needs of their sector would be an impermissible burden on the functionality of such a core sector as the military.

Amid certain subdivisions of the Haredi demographic, there are many young males who have, of recent, become more acculturated to Israeli mores and senses of ‘self’ because of successful engagement with the inter-communal marketplace. Diminished disquiet over what many other Haredim would deem unacceptable assimilation into the secular world is likely to provoke certain well-meaning individuals to want to ‘prove’ to outsiders the capability of ultra-Orthodox persons toward handling the rigors of a contemporary, secular existence, the most blatant example being bearing the hardship of military service125. Seeing the beneficial aspects to one’s person of being engaged financially and socio-culturally with less rigorously devout Jews can also have the manifest effect of corrodning the ingrained ideological anti-Zionism of many of the Haredi sects, lessening the resistance to wanting to engage the state in any way and essentially debunking many of the myths solicited by community leaders to induce suspicion and fear126. Better secular education amongst the Haredim as well, as indicated by the tenfold increase in ultra-Orthodox males attending college over the last decade, also services to lessen superstitious apprehensions over the supposed wrath of God threatening to punish those who stray from the divinely ascribed path, allowing certain Haredim to maintain a reasonable degree of religiosity without straying toward excesses127. Servicing a near-ambassadorial role between the avowedly insular Haredim and the rank and file of Israel’s broader population, these educated, engaged ultra-Orthodox men can potentially convince wavering souls torn over conflicted loyalties to either synagogue or state that it is indeed possible to ‘have it all’ regarding the maintenance of piety and fulfillment of duty to the nation, foreseeably remediating much of the inter-communal tension without having to resort to heavy-handed governmental intervention.

While there very well may be cause for limited optimism regarding the dualistic positioning of the ‘enlightened’ Haredim for integrationists wishing to see due equality in military conscription, the facts on file still augur a majoritarian rejection of I.D.F.

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126  Ibid. Pgs. 129-30
enrollment within this rapidly reproducing sector amongst those still presumed eligible to serve, an unnerving status quo which foresees substantive guls in raw manpower and operational capacity for the military in years to come, as amply alluded to by the exponential growth rates underlined in Figures 2 and 3. All the well-wishing in the world by those individuals within Israel who favor taking a passive approach toward handling the contentious I.D.F. draft issue cannot subsume the fact that participation rates for Haredim have remained at a steadily low rate for the past fifteen years, with only 29 percent of Haredim even bothering to enroll at all, let alone serving the full three years, in sharp contrast to the 75 percent of secular Israelis who fully take part in the army experience. Coupled with generalized failures to engage the Haredim within the annals of the business world, with close to 60 percent of able-bodied ultra-Orthodox males failing to participate in gainful employment owing to the interference of labor with religious study, it becomes self-evident to the outside observer that both fundamental national security and economic health are likely to take a nose-dive should predicted trends come to pass. These ominous trends reflect an endangerment of the ability of Israel to maintain its wellbeing as a nation state in a competitive global clime, as the country remains one of the only OECD nations with a declining pool of eligible workers, an unnerving circumstance that reflects miserably on the nation’s capacity to ensure future economic growth. Although dents in economic prosperity and dynamism are certainly a misfortune, stagnation may be a small price to pay considering the more substantially troublesome threat of national endangerment given Israel’s precarious positioning in a region surrounded by enemies, and with defense being such a priority in this scenario, it is not a major surprise that the draft exemptions prompt more public outrage than the unemployment rates. Therefore, given the seemingly unbroachable impasse that the still-defiant Haredi sector offers, in spite of all the accommodational compromises and forgiving attitudes brokered by Israeli politicians and top military brass, there exists the potential need to engage the ‘nuclear option’ of sorts as a be-all and end-all to this controversy, namely to cut to the chase and legalistically maneuver an end to ultra-Orthodox draft exemptions in totality.

As the Israeli military is presently affronted with not only Haredim choosing to abscond from service, with recent surveys indicating a five percent decline in total male participation from the age brackets usually drafted, citing lack of motivation and concerns of conscientious objection, the I.D.F. is clearly nearing crisis mode, and as is the case with many quagmires, desperate times often call for desperate measures. When those with philosophical quandaries, whether they be religious Haredim or less pious youths with qualms over Israeli military behavior, feel as though they have license to abscond from

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129 Ibid. Pgs. 87-8, 97
service, net motivation in the corps is concomitantly reduced, as many, formerly aspiring young men and women begin to feel taken advantage of and abused, shifting the generalized consensus in mindset from being participatory in an epic struggle for dignity and survival to one of having to endure an onerous burden for which many get off scot free.

Bearing all this in mind and comprehending the ripple effect disengagement from participation amongst some has upon the net collective, certain invested observers have postulated a sort of carrot-and-stick approach towards encouraging all young Israelis of eligible age, Haredi or otherwise, to actively engage themselves in combat-oriented divisions of the Israel Defense Forces. Rather than either shirking from military duties altogether, or veering toward units of the armed forces which do not involve direct engagement, such as intelligence or surveillance roles, it has been supposed by some that a broader deployment of the pilot program currently in place to entice certain young Haredim, namely the aforementioned project involving technical training prior to deployment, should be expanded to the entirety of possible enlistees. Said inducement to those hungry for operable career skills, alongside a promised right of way into university enrollment upon completion of one's three year term serve to be the ostensible 'carrot' of these plans, whilst ideas to cut off welfare payments to those unwilling to serve, a practical death sentence for the Haredi sector, would figure to be the 'stick' beating down upon those still hesitant. In certain ways, portions of the more punishing tact have already been seen through, despite a relative dearth of media coverage reflective of their impact, as embodied by 2003 Knesset legislation which slashed the girth and ease of issuance for which the child benefits allowance system, deemed by many to be the prior lifeblood for Haredi livelihood, would permit, driving certain desperate Haredim into the clutches of the I.D.F. for survival's sake. Skeptics of this immediate drive for change, cognizant of massive unrest which may very well percolate in Haredi neighborhoods upon possible enactment, believe that persuasion towards enhancing enlistment figures should be entirely voluntary for the time being, and that pursuance of greater participatory numbers should be done in a systematic fashion which considers the community's unique cultural mores. Already seeing promising signs in voluntarist efforts such as the Nahal Haredi battalion, whereby a whopping 90% engage in some form of business or educational investment upon discharge, rather than simply re-enrolling into the yeshiva, proponents of the passive approach presuppose positive affects upon the ultra-Orthodox demographic already, affects which can only be enhanced and expanded upon, perhaps exponentially

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so, should continuance be pursued\textsuperscript{134}. Being that both sides of this dialectic are presently at a standstill, whilst Haredi enrollment figures remain stagnant amidst declining overall participation in the military writ large, it would seem from any perceptional lens that the Haredi draft issue is one in which a simplistic, clear-cut solution remains elusive. Owing to the chaos engendered by a multiplicity of perspectives and warring ideologies brought to the forefront in one of the world’s most heated regions, said debate has the unfortunate potentiality to continue onward for years as reserve numbers in the pool of enlistees continue to dwindle, potentially fomenting an unavoidable national security crisis entirely fomented on the basis of a 70-year old piece of legislation.

\textbf{Conclusion-}

Reverting to the initial interlude which commenced this work, said introduction being the perceptual glance upon throngs of black-hatted protestors within Israeli urban spaces taking to the streets in righteous anger over the possibility of conscription, any questions the viewer may have had upon inception have mainly been explained away. The primary sense of mystery and befuddlement that confound the observer when confronted with the fundamentals of ‘why’ these men rail against a nation-state promised as a haven to the Jewish people has likely dissipated when confronted with the theological and eschatological trappings of ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionism. Many visible peculiarities of the Haredim regarding behavior and community activities can further be rationalized once a historicity of the ultra-Orthodox community, from its initial foundation to the present era, is constructed and studied, as a particularistic expose on how the ‘Haredi question’ has roiled secularistic Israeli politics can go a particularly long way toward rationalizing present day, mutualistic animosities. An application of constructivist political theory, an endeavor not for the faint of heart but a highly valuable one regardless, services to deconstruct, and then re-engineer, ontological notions of ‘self’ within and without a collective, and as applied to the ultra-Orthodox demographic can lead to a better understanding of the implicit rooting behind every individual and cumulative action said group engages in. Compared to the seemingly inverse demographic of Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank defying community norms and volunteering to enlist in the I.D.F., the Haredim are exposed as having pronounced parallels to this collective by way of having their seemingly ironic defiance of at-large community norms reinforced and codified by ingrained sentiments and exigent needs, which in turn are justified by internalized psychological impulses. Perusing over charts and graphs detailing clear-as-day quantitative data concerning relative Haredi volunteerism in the civil service sector, alongside the exponentially high growth rates for the ultra-Orthodox demographic, it is

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blatantly made clear to the viewer the potential enormity of having such a substantial fragment of the population excluded from the fundamental task of national defense.

Coupled with the information presented regarding categorization of self-identification for young Arabs within Israel, the demographic from which ethnically Palestinian I.D.F. recruits would be pulled from, an epistemological take on the inherent rooting of self-identification, manifest by how said rooting parleys into reactions to and relationships with the military, also services to be vital when contemplating the peculiar cases of these rare Palestinian soldiers. Having understood the seemingly contradictory, cognitive-dissonance initiating case study of Palestinian I.D.F. troops, it then becomes requisite to tackle the ‘exception to the rule’ for the Haredim and deal with those young ultra-Orthodox men who likewise buck community standards and enlist. For said demographic, only by comprehending their motives, as well as the impetuses encouraging them to break tradition, can the dichotomous interactions that either community (Haredim and Palestinians) has with the Israeli military be adequately processed. Looking forward, the grim possibility that the state of Israel will lack adequate manpower to assure its survival in the near-future is conflated with the potentiality of optimism from observers more sympathetic to the identity politics of the Haredim, as said pundits posit that the at-present passive approach toward subtly attracting more engaged ultra-Orthodox men into specialized units is accruing notable successes. However, all the myriad subsections engaged with thus far, each constituting a significant stake in the determination of character for these often mysterious and misunderstood communities, still ultimately fail to rationalize for many outside observers any definitive solutions to either societal rift, whether it be the contentious Haredi draft issue or the generalized Israeli/Palestinian conflict. To make manifest any intimation of a resolution in that regard, it once again becomes requisite to glean from the postulations of international relations theory, most notably the identitarian-oriented constructivist wing of thought discussed in moderate detail prior, for any passive or active observer not belonging to either profiled community to possibly make heads or tails of where these groupings are headed, rather than being merely content to ponder historicity.

The concept of societal inculcation, namely the conditioning of the ‘tabula rasa’ individual from birth onward towards becoming a full-fledged, participatory member of any given cultural paradigm, is given substantive credence by ideologically constructivist philosophers owing to the indubitable centrality implicit and explicit modes of rearing have on shaping perception both ‘in favor’ to one’s ‘own kind’, as well as ‘against’ those not cut from the same mold. Since the dawn of the earliest of human civilizations, one of the most predominant and effective means by which said inculcation has been enacted has been through the institution of public education, ‘public’ being conceived in the sense of having multiple children sent to a given educational facility for an outside teacher to provide instruction. With the relatively marginal exception of homeschooled children, particularly outside the confines of the seemingly laissez-faire United States, both government-run, and often religiously-oriented private schools, almost unwaveringly
subscribe to all core tenets of the preeminent ideological underpinnings and values systems of their respective cultural backgrounds. As is often explicitly stated in the statements of purpose now composed by en vogue educational establishments looking to impart an impression on the parents of enrolled children, schooling is just as much an exercise in formulating and unleashing a prototype of any society’s idealized participant as it is a tool for transmitting valuable information to its pupils, with the earnest hope by participants that their ‘end results’ turn out to be functional and productive citizens. When one gleans to understand the purpose of ‘social studies’ or ‘civics’ classes within the given curriculums of schools around the world, the unabashed aegis of providing said classes is to implant the codices of identification with the nation-state one happens to have had the fortune of being born under, in order to gain a feeling of patriotism and gratitude for the accomplishments and historical struggles done collectively in its name135. For many deviatory subcultures extant within the confines of the planet’s disparate countries and societal units, self-exclusionary attitudes towards dealing with ‘mainstream’ educational apparatuses preclude a noticeable lack of transmission of these mores to their impressionable offspring, placing these individuals at odds with their omnisciently surrounding government when they come of age. Israel’s ultra-Orthodox community services to be a prime example of this archetype in action, albeit one, owing to the complexity of the state’s patronage of yeshivas, whereby contrarian schooling systems suffice to be government-funded as they preach invective against normative societal values and even the existence of the nation-state proper136. As community leaders from within the ultra-Orthodox sector often inculcate anti-Zionist and anti-I.D.F. sentiments amongst Haredi youth from the youngest of ages, institutions that are generally considered to be divinely-ascribed units for religious education instead take the form of training centers for the eventual battleground of street protest, preparing Haredi males from early childhood to eventually risk life and limb in order to avoid possible conscription137.

Conterminously, within the confines of the Israeli-occupied West Bank, whereby a paper tiger of a government known as the Palestinian Authority (PA) administers governmental services under ostensibly Arab auspices, notoriety has been attracted in recent years owing to the presence of seething invective against the Israeli state and Jews in general within the content of textbooks and lessons. Presumably training up Palestinian youth to be ‘soldiers’ in the struggle against Israel in a not-so dissimilar fashion to the way recalcitrant ultra-Orthodox yeshivas encourage militancy against the ‘heretical’ secular authorities, said animosity provokes a chain reaction amongst those reared in an ‘Israeli’

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137 Ibid. Pg. 41
mindset, seeing a lack of a potential ‘partner for peace’ amongst seemingly bellicose anti-Semites ready to pick a fight. Presumably, amidst the peripheral minority of Palestinians that surprisingly defy all hostile education to participate in the I.D.F. as an occupying force, preceding allusions within this text to the economic desperation of the West Bank Palestinian, deprived of livelihood and land by the domineering Israelis, suggest desire for simple economic stability as the causation for forgoing one’s pride to enlist. Israeli Jews, who generally lack the rank disenfranchisement and sheer desperation of the Palestinian sector, save the traditional marginalization of communities such as the ethnic Mizrahi and Ethiopian Jews, must conversely find other pulls for solidifying the entrenched notion, pushed upon them since early childhood, that military service is a bygone conclusion. For sub-sectors of mainline Israeli society, such as the devout, but still passionately Zionist National Religious community, participation in the grand national project of the I.D.F. is portrayed as akin to an incontrovertible mandate from on high, and partaking in the ascribed community of the military’s rank and file is deemed amongst the highest of mitzvahs (good deeds) to be fulfilled as a Jew subject to the laws of God and the prophets. Much of the collective mentality that ascribes an individual of said geographic location to become a proper ‘Israeli’ of sorts is formulated through the ardor of a three-year term of service in the corps. The I.D.F., amongst those groups participant in its operation (excluding the already marginalized, yet growing Haredi and Arab sectors), has been largely successful in binding together disparate ethnic and religious strains within a country predicated on outside immigration and influence, serving as a role model for certain observers as to how assimilatory measures can function for diverse populaces.

Bearing that in mind, and denoting the ironic positioning of the Jewish faith as being an arbiter for both impassioned embracement and rejection of potential military service in the I.D.F., the I.D.F. itself can be said to encompass an educational institution in many ways, owing to its underlying, yet principal positioning as a state-run body aiming to impart norms in practice and thought amongst its conscripted enrollees. The experiences garnered from a term in the IDF, or indeed any martial unit the world over, translate themselves in the psyches of the participant as codified knowledge about not only how to carry out certain skill sets, but as well constitute a pedagogy as to how the surrounding world should be perceived and reacted to, a reality which will inevitably be

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141 Ibid. Pg. 214
called upon post-conscription in the myriad scenarios of daily life. As with all educational constructs, ‘othering’ of differing persons with different group allegiances to oneself, whether they be classified as merely ‘different’ or directly inimical to one’s own interests, is an essential part of the learning praxis across all societies and cultures, and the ‘othering’ of Haredim and Arabs who are not joined to the broader national community by means of mutualistic military service inevitably fall into the latter category. Therefore, to potentially enact change as to how Haredim are at-presently excluded for service, and in order to ameliorate attitudes toward Haredim from the majority of other sectors within Israeli society, perhaps the only means by which this can be carried out would be through a sea change in the structuration of relationships between all these myriad facets of the national body politic, radically reforming the way either side is taught about the ‘other’ amidst them. As things currently stand, however, this would seem to be a Sisyphean burden of sorts given intrinsic processes of identity formation as an embedded given in all aspects of Israeli society writ large, potentially prolonging the ideological segregation between Israeli Jew, Haredi, and Arab for the considerable future and ensuring that no major dent in the status quo is accomplished.

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142 Adler, Emanuel. "Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates." Handbook of International Relations. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2013. 112-44. Print. Pg. 113
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