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RETOOLING U.S. POLICY FOR PEACE IN COLOMBIA *by Milburn Line*

SUMMARY

It is time to reconsider U.S. policy in Colombia, including adding a peace agenda to our strategy. Following problematic and inconclusive results of more than a decade of support known as Plan Colombia, which is largely directed to the Colombian military, the Obama administration should retool U.S. policy. Adding support for a peace process offers specific policy benefits, including:

- *protecting civilian populations by reducing violations of human rights and humanitarian law;*
- *strengthening democratic practice and creating consensus on a post-conflict Colombia;*
- *improving relations between Colombia and its neighbors;*
- *creating clearer policy channels for other U.S. priorities, including free trade and efforts to control the illicit narcotics trade; and*
- *renewing respect for American leadership in the region.*

Getting it right in Colombia means a sober review of our current policy short-comings, learning from other peace processes in the region and incorporating specific peacebuilding strategies into our efforts. Fortunately, President Juan Manuel Santos' initial steps during the first six months following his inauguration in August 2010 indicate that the window of opportunity for peace may be opening.

HISTORY OF CONFLICT AND EFFORTS FOR PEACE

The ongoing insurgencies in Colombia began as classic Cold War confrontations in the 1960s based on historical inequities and land tenancy disputes, as well as the legacies of political and social conflict from the 12-year period known as *La Violencia*, following the assassination of political leader Jose Eliécer Gaitán in 1948. From the 1970s on the conflict developed now familiar patterns of kidnappings for ransom by the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and attacks on civilians by the combatants on all sides, including paramilitaries protecting the interests of local elites and often working in coordination with the Colombian Armed Forces, as they fought over territory and drug production zones.

President Andrés Pastrana's failed efforts for peace at San Vicente de Caguán between 1998 and 2002 are often cited as proof of the futility of a peace agenda in Colombia. The perception of his having ceded too much, including a 42,000-square-kilometer free movement zone for the FARC, became political fodder for President Álvaro Uribe's subsequent call to defeat the FARC by military means. U.S. President Bill Clinton's initial \$1.3 billion¹ pledge of assistance through Plan Colombia has since become a fixture in U.S. support.²

A concerted peace initiative has not been undertaken since Caguán. After 10 years and \$7 billion of U.S. support in Plan Colombia - which has been overwhelmingly directed to the Colombian security forces - the Colombian government has made some gains in defeating the FARC and other Marxist guerrillas and containing the illicit narcotics economy, but they are far from definitive. (See *Box 1* below.)

BOX 1: 10 YEARS INTO PLAN COLOMBIA

The majority of Colombians beyond Bogotá and Medellín - especially Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations "often caught in the crossfire between the army and the illegal groups,"³ and peasants trying to survive in the combat and fumigation zones in Meta, Nariño, Putumayo and others - have suffered tremendously during the 10 years of Plan Colombia support. The following paints a bleak picture of results to date:

- Colombia now has more displaced persons (3 to 4 million depending on the source) than any other country in the world except Sudan. Many of these live in impoverished and violent settlements ringing urban centers.
- The military continues to be accused of serious human rights violations, including some 3,000 cases under investigation in the Colombian courts in which civilians were allegedly recruited, murdered and then presented as combat kills.
- The intelligence service that reports directly to the president was caught last year harassing human rights advocates and monitoring Supreme Court justices.

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- A plea-bargaining plan, known as the Justice and Peace Law, to prosecute thousands of paramilitaries – supported with tens of millions of dollars in funds from the U.S. Department of Justice – has convicted only three persons in five years (and one is under appeal). Meanwhile, many paramilitaries who have been incarcerated while awaiting due process may be released after serving the maximum sentence of eight years, without facing trial for alleged atrocities. Government of Colombia statistics indicate that up to 8,000 of the paramilitaries demobilized under the law have returned to criminal activities.⁴
- Impunity continues for thousands of victims of sexual violence, recognized as a weapon of war in use for decades in Colombia.⁵ Incidents of sexual violence remain largely unprosecuted.
- Homicide statistics indicate that Colombia continues to be the most dangerous place in the world to be a trade unionist. A leading union released figures in August 2010 that 36 trade unionists had been murdered so far last year.⁶
- Up to 14,000 children and minors have been recruited into the various armed factions.⁷
- Government of Colombia statistics now list 51,000 disappeared, with 32,000 categorized as forced disappearances – numbers that are similar to the most egregious cases in the region (30,000 in Argentina and 40,000 in Guatemala).⁸
- Colombia’s public security gains in some cities and in controlling the highways have created an inflated sense of achievement. But the murder rate is still 15,000 to 20,000 a year, depending on the source,⁹ in a country of 45 million. (Contrast this with the highly publicized estimated 28,000 deaths over the last two years in the war on drugs in Mexico, a country of 110 million.¹⁰) Civil society organizations have alleged under-reporting by the Government of Colombia on key security issues like kidnapping.¹¹ The Government of Colombia announced additional security measures to combat rampant violence in the city of Medellín in September 2010.¹²

U.S. support for Plan Colombia cannot be dissociated from the prevailing impunity and injustice.¹³ Support for military efforts that have been linked to human rights violations and massive internal displacement damages U.S. credibility, especially if the very military brigades receiving U.S. assistance demonstrate increased propensity for extrajudicial executions, as reported in a recent study.¹⁴

Much of U.S. non-military assistance is now directed toward supporting the transformation of the regions most affected by the conflict,¹⁵ which have suffered severe humanitarian impacts from the military assistance in Plan Colombia; it will take some time to produce tangible results for local populations. The U.S. Department of Justice has invested tens of millions of earmarked funds for the Justice and Peace Law, with just two successful prosecutions after five years and a clear failure to detect and investigate sexual violence that was a common practice by paramilitary organizations. The absence of a peace agenda by either the U.S. or Colombian governments allows critics in the region to communicate simplistic portrayals of militaristic hegemony that resonate with those affected during the Cold War by anti-communist repression.

WHY PEACE COULD WORK, AND THE BENEFITS OF TRYING

Northern Ireland peace advocate Paul Arthur notes that almost all groups involved in conflict portray their dispute as unique and intractable, and justify continued violence on the supposed intransigence of the other side.¹⁶ This cynical perspective on the possibilities of peace is often an excuse that prolongs conflict.

Despite the prevailing pessimism that helps sustain conflict, peace has been achieved in other scenarios (beyond Northern Ireland) deemed hopeless and with alleged terrorists and war criminals, including under the auspices of U.S. leadership. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke brokered a peace agreement with three ethno-nationalist leaders accused of supporting ethnic cleansing, including Slobodan Milosevic who died while being

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prosecuted for war crimes. The U.S. continues to be committed to a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict despite setbacks and tremendous challenges.

This is applicable to Colombia as well, which continues to suffer from an outdated Cold War confrontation, sustained in part beyond its normal life-cycle by a political discourse that delegitimizes peace; the availability of abundant resources for the insurgency through the illicit narcotics trade; a reduced democratic space that discourages pluralism and accommodation of diverse social agendas within the political framework; and the potential self-perpetuating institutional momentum created by massive U.S. military assistance. Those who doubt the possibility of a negotiated demobilization of the FARC should remember Colombia's successful record of previous demobilizations of insurgents in the 1980s and 1990s.¹⁷

Some of the arguments that deny the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the Colombian conflict are detailed in *Box 2* below.

BOX 2: CONVINCING THE SKEPTICS

“President Pastrana tried, failed and was manipulated by the FARC”:

This affirmation underpinned President Uribe's policy of seeking a military solution. A renewed effort for peace does not have to begin with the concessions ceded during the Caguán process, especially since the FARC have dropped some key demands in their latest call for negotiations, including the creation of a demilitarized zone.¹⁸

“The FARC are not reliable negotiating partners; they are terrorists”:

Many peace negotiations have been conducted with interlocutors not deemed reliable at the outset, like the Irish Republican Army in the aforementioned example. The FARC have been weakened, have signaled a willingness to discuss negotiation scenarios, and now may be more likely to comply with agreed standards for conduct. President Santos has defined pre-conditions for negotiation to ensure confidence in any proceedings, most recently during a January 26, 2011 state visit to France.¹⁹

“A military victory is imminent”:

While the FARC is indeed weakened, abundant resources from the illicit narcotics economy may mean continued operational capacity. The FARC are estimated to have a sizeable fighting force of 8,000 to 10,000 combatants²⁰ and continue to conduct frequent attacks on Colombian security forces that inflict casualties.²¹ Public opinion polls recently indicated that 57 percent of Colombians polled believed that the insurgencies would continue for 50 years or more or never be resolved.²² The FARC's continued threat to state security, despite high-level losses, was recently recognized by the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs,²³ and the International Crisis Group recently reported that “a complete military victory is unlikely” and warned of the dangers of increased criminality of a splintered FARC.²⁴

“It's a waste of time since the FARC have their own sense of time and, after 40 years, will use peace negotiations to delay and regroup”:

This may be true of previous attempts but does not have to be the case if negotiators establish standards to initiate the process.

U.S. policymakers should consider the benefits of adding a peace agenda to the mix, even if the peace process eventually fails. Mobilizing a peace process could:

- articulate standards of human rights and democratic practice for both the insurgents and the Colombian security forces;
- shed light on and help restrain current breaches of basic rights;
- build democratic social capital by putting Colombia's civilian population at the forefront of a rights-based agenda;

- create social consensus on a stable future;
- project a more balanced agenda through U.S. leadership for peace; and
- help define a more constructive relationship with Colombia's neighbors.

All of these results could be achieved as part of a negotiations process, even if a peace agreement was not attained.

There are at least three potential results of a peace agenda:

1. *A successful negotiation ends the conflict and demobilizes the insurgents:*
All of the aforementioned potential benefits accrue;
2. *It fails and the FARC is defeated militarily:*
All of the aforementioned benefits potentially accrue.
3. *It fails and the FARC continues to operate:*
We are at the same point as at present but all of the aforementioned benefits potentially accrue.

More specifically, the benefits of pursuing a peace agenda are outlined in *Box 3* below.

“Both the Government of Colombia and the U.S. would do well to embrace the capacity and potential of Colombian civil society efforts for peace, as it is often the broader dialogue and initiatives that create a foundation for sustainable peace and reconciliation.”

BOX 3: THE BENEFITS OF A PEACE INITIATIVE IN COLOMBIA

For Colombians who have been engulfed in 50 years of conflict, a peace process could:

- protect civilian populations by reducing violations of human rights and humanitarian law following an initial negotiated statement of standards and a cease-fire;
- create more possibilities for resolving historic social conflict, including land and political reform. Addressing egregious rights violations against the population will transform the discussion beyond a Marxist revolutionary lens;
- be a platform for creating consensus on aspirations for a post-conflict Colombia;
- allow security forces to address other critical forms of violence like newly emerging criminal syndicates that have evolved from paramilitary structures;²⁵
- prevent the insurgencies from splintering into local criminal groups;
- create the possibility of redirecting Colombian, U.S. and other military assistance to social development efforts that address the underpinnings of the armed conflict;
- build social cohesion as previously demonized civil society peace initiatives are recognized as part of broader and more inclusive democratic practice where they can influence policy; and
- improve relations between Colombia and its neighbors.

For the U.S., supporting a peace process could:

- demonstrate multilateral engagement for peace, thus deflating the rhetoric of populist leaders in countries surrounding Colombia that portray the U.S. with Cold War slogans about militarism and imperialism;
- lead to the redirecting of U.S. military assistance to social development and more inclusive democracy strengthening efforts;
- create clearer policy channels for other U.S. priorities, including free trade and efforts to control the illicit narcotics trade by improving human rights standards and the rule of law (a blocking point in the free trade discussion), and allowing public security to focus on the drug trade instead of the insurgency; and
- increase respect for American leadership in the region.

For the region, a peace process could:

- offer the potential for an experience of consensus-building to foster working

relations between countries that have been at odds with each other,²⁶ which could be transferred to other issues like the illicit narcotics trade;

- improve regional security by ensuring a regime is put in place to prevent FARC use of neighboring territory in Ecuador and Venezuela; and
- transcend the mutual recriminations that resulted in military saber-rattling, including mobilizing troops on the border and a 30 percent decline in Colombian-Venezuelan trade in 2009.²⁷

“...multilateral engagement offers benefits for regional security that warrant the investment in diplomatic wrangling.”

INPUTS FOR A PEACE STRATEGY

The moral argument for renewed U.S. support for peace should be evident, given the disturbing human rights and humanitarian results of the last decade. This brief has argued that there are also clear policy benefits that justify consideration of a peace agenda in the U.S. strategy.²⁸ The next steps for building a peace agenda back into our approach should include the following four criteria:

1. Colombian ownership

Colombian ownership of a process of peacebuilding is key to its success. The previous administration in Colombia demonized civil society efforts and linked them to the insurgency in a dangerous manipulation of public discourse. President Santos, to his credit, has committed to reversing this practice, has the political capital and has taken initial steps that indicate he could lead such a process (see *Box 4* below). Fortunately, Colombian civil society also has a rich capacity for this task, with diverse organizations already building a foundation for an eventual process. This includes an effort to define minimal criteria (*acuerdos mínimos*) and leadership by the Catholic Church and civil society organizations including REDEPAZ, *Iniciativa de Mujeres para la Paz*, *Ideas para la Paz*, *Colombianos y Colombianas por la Paz* and others. *ExpoPaz-la paz en concreto*, organized by the U.N. Development Programme from October 27 to 29, 2010 in Bogotá, brought together representatives of more than 150 local peace initiatives. Both the Government of Colombia and the U.S. would do well to embrace the capacity and potential of Colombian civil society efforts for peace, as it is often the broader dialogue and initiatives that create a foundation for sustainable peace and reconciliation.

Both the U.S. and Colombian governments should be consciously working to expand the ability of Colombian democracy to include a broad range of opposition and social advocacy, rather than continuing to reduce public space – as in the case of dismissing and barring Senator Piedad Córdoba from public service.²⁹

BOX 4: NOW'S THE TIME – PRESIDENT JUAN MANUEL SANTOS' POLITICAL WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

President Santos, inaugurated on August 7, 2010, won a landslide victory with close to 70 percent of the vote.³⁰ His approval ratings have soared as high as 88 percent (following the military attack in September that resulted in the death of the second in command of the FARC)³¹ and even 90 percent more recently.³² This gives him extraordinary political capital to lead for peace.

In his inaugural address, President Santos left open the door to peace negotiations. His vice president has since been instructed to explore the possibilities of peace negotiations with FARC interlocutors.³³

Following the inauguration, President Santos immediately met President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and agreed to restore diplomatic relations and work together to address the countries' previous, acrimonious differences.³⁴ He later named a skilled former ambassador to Venezuela as his minister of foreign affairs. Venezuela has recently extradited three FARC members to Bogotá³⁵ and worked with Colombia to define

joint counter-narcotics protocols,³⁶ something inconceivable just a few months ago. Santos has also worked to restore diplomatic relations with Ecuador,³⁷ and efforts are underway to repair relations, including holding joint military exercises in the Amazon, with other neighbors in the region.³⁸

The new president has indicated he will not brand civil society in the “us and them” political style of his predecessor. Furthermore, he announced establishment of a joint government-civil society human rights commission,³⁹ supported accession to the Convention on Forced Displacement,⁴⁰ and has begun to address many of the social demands of the insurgencies, including land and political reform,⁴¹ and personally presented a draft Law for Victims in Congress.⁴²

Public opinion polls recently indicated that 74 percent of Colombians polled believed that the Government of Colombia should dialogue with the FARC/ELN insurgencies.⁴³

Leading a peace agenda would do much for the Government of Colombia’s desire to win an eventual seat on the Security Council at the United Nations. Achieving peace would also do much for President Santos’ goal of a “democratic prosperity” agenda, which may depend on re-channeling significant resources, both domestic and international, from military to development objectives.⁴⁴

“Over time a peace architecture encompasses and strengthens our current concept of hard security by ensuring inclusive dialogue, democratic participation and institutional response that can address both ongoing violence and structural violence that underpins historic conflict.”

2. Multilateral engagement

Peace initiatives in the region have been built around “Group of Friends” coalitions of governments. This modality also presents an opportunity to define more positive relations with Colombia’s neighbors, as detailed above. An initial consortium might include the U.S., a European partner like Spain, and some combination of neighboring countries, some of whom have been accused by Colombia of harboring FARC rebels. One key goal would be to ensure their support at getting the FARC to the negotiating table and complying with agreements.

Convincing the Government of Colombia, which continues to insist that it will be the sole arbiter of any direct negotiations,⁴⁵ will not be easy. But multilateral engagement offers benefits for regional security that warrant the investment in diplomatic wrangling. A shared multilateral effort could also offer an important consensus-building experience with some of the leaders that have emerged in the region, whose commitment to democratic development might be demonstrated.⁴⁶ International verification has proven effective in past experience in the region (see point 3 below), and Colombia has already called for it following its allegations at the Organization of American States that Venezuela harbors the FARC in its territory.⁴⁷ The U.S. is certainly strategically positioned to be an effective advocate on this issue with the Government of Colombia.

3. Define Foundational Document(s)

An agenda for peace could be built around an initial foundational document and timetable for negotiations, as was agreed in Guatemala in the early 1990s. The United Nations-brokered Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights (March 29, 1994) delineated clear human rights standards for the Guatemalan security forces and the URNG insurgency that were monitored internationally for two years, leading up to definitive peace accords in 1996, and violations were reduced drastically. This momentum led to an eventual cease-fire and compliance with a timetable of peace accords based on multiple, historic themes.⁴⁸ This type of initial foundational document could provide clear standards for Colombian security forces and the FARC and create the momentum for a longer process. The potential benefits for civilian populations caught in conflict zones cannot be overemphasized.

4. Peacebuilding as policy

A 3D vision of security that builds on balanced efforts for development, diplomacy and defense has been advanced by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and U.S. civil

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society,⁴⁹ which has mobilized to incorporate peacebuilding language in a reformed Foreign Assistance Act.⁵⁰ Over time a peace architecture encompasses and strengthens our current concept of hard security by ensuring inclusive dialogue, democratic participation and institutional response that can address both ongoing violence and structural violence that underpins historic conflicts.

A peace initiative is not simply the articulation of idealistic goals but should be built around the practices and methodologies of truth-telling and accountability, conflict transformation, institutional reform and social cohesion. As Lisa Schirch notes, “A peacebuilding framework prevents, reduces, transforms and helps people to recover from violence in all forms while at the same time empowering people to foster relationships at all levels to create structural justice. . . . Peacebuilding is a process of constructing or reconstructing state structures to foster peace and human security.”⁵¹

CONCLUSION

Building on the initial steps President Santos has taken that broaden the possibilities for a peace process, a strategic opportunity exists for the U.S. to support a peace initiative in Colombia:

- The FARC is weakened and may be reaching out for a negotiated solution that it could accept as a credible exit to its half-century insurgency.
- The alternative may be prolonged and inconclusive violence, considered “low-intensity” only by analysts not living in the conflict zones or populations trapped in or between the parties at war.
- A multilateral initiative could reduce the suffering of civilians caught in combat operations by articulating standards for both sides, which could be internationally monitored.
- Developing a peace agenda could broaden social and political discourse and practice, limited by decades of national security ideology, that in turn strengthen the social contract that underpins peaceful democratic structures.
- Visible U.S. leadership for peace would deflate the anti-American rhetoric from Colombia’s neighbors.
- A multilateral process could also define a more positive role for Colombia’s neighbors by ensuring their support at getting the FARC to the negotiating table and to comply with agreements.

This strategy – which worked in Guatemala, where a sustained, multi-country effort reduced human rights violations and created visionary agreements to redefine Guatemalan social and political reality – could end another 40-year, Cold War-era conflict.

The alternative is the inversion of the potential benefits of a peace agenda: continued violence against civilians, continued negative perceptions of U.S. and Government of Colombia military agendas dominating human rights and humanitarian concerns, continued potential for destabilized relations between Colombia and its neighbors, and continued inconclusive and costly conflict in terms of both human suffering and financial resources.

¹BBC News, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1759419.stm>, January 15, 2002.

²See “Colombia: Don’t call it a model,” Washington Office on Latin America, at www.wola.org.

³“Colombia: President Santos’s Conflict Resolution Opportunity,” International Crisis Group, October 13, 2010, 2.

⁴“El 15 por ciento de los desmovilizados reincide en actividades criminales,” *El Tiempo*, December 16, 2010.

⁵“Entre 2001 y 2009, violaron 95,000 mujeres en el marco del conflicto,” *El Tiempo*, December 9, 2010.

⁶“Unos 36 líderes sindicales han sido asesinados en Colombia en 2010, según la CUT,” *El Tiempo*, September 14, 2010.

⁷Save the Children UK, Colombia page. www.savethechildren.org.uk/en/colombia.htm.

⁸In Search of Colombia’s Disappeared,” Latin America Working Group, U.S. Office on Colombia, December 2010.

⁹“Disminución histórica en homicidios en 2010,” *El Tiempo*, January 22, 2011, lists 15,459 as a record decrease.

¹⁰Colombia has 35 homicides per 100,000 people and Mexico has 15, according to “List of countries by intentional homicide rate” on Wikipedia. Another study of homicides of young people, RITLA Map of Violence: The Young People of Latin America 2008, listed Colombia with 43.8 and Mexico with 9.3 homicides per 100,000 people.

¹¹“País Libre denuncia que la verdad del secuestro se borra de un brochazo,” *El Tiempo*, November 15, 2010.

¹²“Presidente Santos anunció cambios operativos para luchar contra el crimen en Medellín,” *El Tiempo*, August 31, 2010.

¹³Lisa Haugaard, “When Our Government Trains Armies in Colombia and Mexico, We Become Responsible,” *Huffington Post*,

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October 6, 2010.

¹⁴Fellowship of Reconciliation/U.S. Office on Colombia, "Military Assistance and Human Rights: Colombia, U.S. Accountability and Global Implications," <http://forusa.org/sites/default/files/uploads/militaryaid100729web.pdf>.

¹⁵USAID/Colombia Mission Strategy 2009-2013," http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACN918.pdf.

¹⁶"The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Then and Now," lecture by Arthur at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, University of San Diego, September 16, 2010.

¹⁷The Virgilio Barco administration (1986-90) successfully demobilized M-19, while that of César Gaviria (1990-94) demobilized the Peoples' Liberation Army (EPL), the Quintín Lame group and the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT).

¹⁸Virginia Bouvier, "Cautious Optimism for Peace in Colombia," U.S. Institute of Peace, September 15, 2010.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 3, and "Presidente Santos condiciona eventual diálogo de paz con las FARC," *El Tiempo*, January 27, 2011.

²⁰Crisis Group, *op. cit.*, i.

²¹"Mueren en combate un soldado y tres guerrilleros de las FARC," *El Tiempo*, December 18, 2010; "Tres soldados y un guerrillero cayeron en combate en Norte de Santander," *El Tiempo*, December 10, 2010; "Dos policías y un soldado murieron en ataques de las FARC en Arauca," *El Tiempo*, December 6, 2010; "Presidente Santos condenó atentado de las Farc en Vegalarga (Huila)," *El Tiempo*, November 30, 2010; "Combates en Huila dejan tres soldados muertos y dos heridos," *El Tiempo*, November 24, 2010; "Ataque de las FARC deja tres militares muertos en el Cauca," *El Tiempo*, November 24, 2010; "Ocho policías y militares murieron en combates contra las Farc," *El Tiempo*, November 23, 2010; "Van 20 ataques a Toribío (Cauca) este año," *El Tiempo*, November 18, 2010; "Cuatro soldados y ocho guerrilleros dejan combates en Arauca," *El Tiempo*, November 14, 2010; "Otros 6 policías muertos por ataque de Farc y Eln, Muere en atentado comandante del Batallón Ingenieros en Putumayo," *El Tiempo*, November 1, 2010; "Triste identificación de los 14 carabineros," *El Tiempo*, September 4, 2010; "Ocho muertos y 16 heridos dejaron ataques de guerrilla contra Ejército y Policía en 4 departamentos," *El Tiempo*, September 2, 2010; "Muere un soldado y otro resulta herido en ataque de la guerrilla en Arauca," *El Tiempo*, August 16, 2010; "FARC Disparó a patrulla de soldados y policías Ataque en Caquetá deja 6 muertos," *El Tiempo*, August 1, 2010; "Por ataque de las Farc a puesto de control de la Policía, reforzarán seguridad en Puerto Concordia," *El Tiempo*, July 5, 2010; "CTI descubre supuesto plan de las Farc para repetir atentados en posesión presidencial," *El Tiempo*, June 29, 2010; "En Caquetá, golpe más fuerte contra la Fuerza Pública en el 2010," *El Tiempo*, May 24, 2010; "El Ejército y la Armada libran fuertes combates con las Farc en Chocó y Valle del Cauca," *El Tiempo*, January 24, 2010.

²²www.semana.com. November 18, 2010.

²³Frank Mora, quoted in "EE. UU. sigue muy interesado en firmar acuerdo militar con Colombia," *El Tiempo*, October 11, 2010.

²⁴Crisis Group, *op. cit.*, i and 22.

²⁵"Bandas emergentes: 10 mil capturas desde 2007 y siguen vivas," *El Tiempo*, December 18, 2010.

²⁶The Uribe government requested an extraordinary meeting of the OAS permanent council on July 22, 2010 to present evidence of ELN and FARC camps inside Venezuela and called for a commission to verify the claims. President Hugo Chávez responded by breaking diplomatic relations," Crisis Group, *op. cit.*, 4.

²⁷Simon Romero, "Leaders Repair Colombia-Venezuela Ties," *New York Times*, August 10, 2010.

²⁸Crisis Group also recommends that the U.S. Government "Announce support for exploring negotiations to end the conflict ...," in *op. cit.*, iii.

²⁹"Colombian Senator, Accused of Aiding Rebels, is Dismissed," *New York Times*, September 27, 2010.

³⁰Crisis Group, *op. cit.*, 1.

³¹"Golpe a guerrilla dispara imagen de Santos a 88%, según encuesta del Centro Nacional de Consultoría," *El Tiempo*, September 24, 2010.

³²"90% respalda la gestión de Santos, según encuesta," *El Tiempo*, December 7, 2010.

³³Crisis Group, *op. cit.*, 22.

³⁴Simon Romero, "Leaders Repair Colombia-Venezuela Ties," *New York Times*, August 10, 2010.

³⁵"Los tres guerrilleros expulsados de Venezuela ya están en Bogotá," *El Tiempo*, November 17, 2010.

³⁶"Colombia y Venezuela definen protocolos para lucha contra narcotráfico," *El Tiempo*, November 19, 2010.

³⁷"No podemos borrar el pasado, pero tenemos que ver hacia el futuro," *El Tiempo*, November 27, 2010.

³⁸"Colombia, Brasil y Perú anuncian lucha contra el delito en la frontera," *El Tiempo*, November 26, 2010.

³⁹"Colombia trabaja en creación de una comisión de Derechos Humanos," *El Tiempo*, October 29, 2010.

⁴⁰"Aprueban adhesión de Colombia a Convención contra desaparición forzada," *El Tiempo*, October 19, 2010.

⁴¹"Gobierno les devolverá 300 predios a desplazados," *El Tiempo*, October 15, 2010.

⁴²"Presidente Santos presentó en el Congreso la ley de víctimas," *El Tiempo*, September 27, 2010. ⁴³www.semana.com. November 18, 2010.

⁴⁴Crisis Group recommends that the Government of Colombia "[e]stablish and actively pursue a road map for negotiations with FARC and ELN aimed at ending the conflict without worsening impunity and consider how possible third-party support for a negotiations/peace process might best be utilised." in *op. cit.*, ii.

⁴⁵Bouvier, *op. cit.*

⁴⁶Jorge Castañeda, "The Not Ready for Prime Time Players," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2010.

⁴⁷The Uribe government requested an extraordinary meeting of the OAS permanent council on 22 July 2010 to present evidence of ELN and FARC camps inside Venezuela and called for a commission to verify the claims. President Hugo Chávez responded by breaking diplomatic relations." Crisis Group, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁴⁸These unfortunately were never implemented fully, which in part explains the continued corruption, social exclusion and public violence in Guatemala.

⁴⁹Robert Gates, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2009, and www.3dsecurity.org.

⁵⁰"Foreign Assistance Act Reform," Advocacy page, www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org.

⁵¹Lisa Schirch, "Linking Human Rights and Conflict Transformation, A Peacebuilding Framework," *Human Rights & Conflict, Exploring the Links between Rights, Law and Peacebuilding* (U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006), 64 and 71.